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LECTURE	  
EXIT,	  VOICE,	  AND	  DISLOYALTY	  HEATHER	  K.	  GERKEN†	  INTRODUCTION	  This	   Lecture	   begins	   with	   a	   puzzle	   about	   Albert	   Hirschman’s	  famous	  work,	  Exit,	  Voice,	  and	  Loyalty:1	  Why	  do	  we	  make	  much	  of	  exit	  and	   voice	   but	   utterly	   neglect	   loyalty?	   It’s	   a	   question	   that	   goes	   well	  beyond	  Hirschman’s	  book.	  For	  example,	  much	  of	  constitutional	  theory	  is	  preoccupied	  with	  a	  single	  question:	  What	  does	  a	  democracy	  owe	  its	  minorities?	  And	  most	  of	  the	  answers	  to	  this	  question	  fit	  naturally	  into	  the	   two	   categories	   Hirschman	  made	   famous:	   voice	   and	   exit.	   On	   both	  the	  rights	  side	  and	  the	  structural	  side	  of	  constitutional	  theory,	  scholars	  worry	  about	  providing	  minorities	  with	  an	  adequate	  level	  of	   influence.	  And	   the	   solutions	   they	   propose	   almost	   inevitably	   offer	   minorities	   a	  chance	   at	   voice	   or	   exit,	   as	   if	   no	   other	   option	   exists.	   The	   First	  Amendment,	   for	   instance,	   offers	   minorities	   the	   right	   to	   free	   speech	  (voice)	   and	   private	   association	   (exit).	   Similarly,	   structural	  arrangements	  give	  minorities	   the	  chance	   to	  vote	   in	  national	  elections	  (voice)	  and	  in	  state	  elections	  (exit).	  
	  The	  Brainerd	  Currie	  Memorial	  Lecture	  has	  been	  held	  annually	  at	  Duke	  University	  School	  of	  Law	  since	  1967.	  It	  is	  both	  an	  honor	  and	  a	  tradition	  for	  the	  Duke	  Law	  Journal	  to	  publish	  the	  remarks	  of	  the	   distinguished	   speakers	   whom	   our	   faculty	   members	   invite	   to	   deliver	   each	   year’s	   lecture.	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken	  delivered	  this	  Lecture	  at	  Duke	  Law	  School	  on	  March	  27,	  2012.	  	  Copyright	  ©	  2013	  by	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken.	  	   †	  	   	  J.	  Skelly	  Wright	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Yale	  Law	  School.	  I	  am	  deeply	  grateful	  to	  the	  Duke	  Law	  faculty	   for	   inviting	   me	   to	   deliver	   this	   paper	   as	   the	   Brainerd	   Currie	   Memorial	   Lecture	   and	   for	  providing	  such	  helpful	  feedback.	  For	  excellent	  comments	  and	  suggestions,	  I	  owe	  thanks	  to	  Bruce	  Ackerman,	  Yair	  Listokin,	  Luke	  Norris,	  Tom	  Wolf,	  Ernie	  Young,	  and	   the	   faculties	  of	  Cardozo	  Law	  School,	   George	  Washington	   University	   Law	   School,	   Quinnipiac	   University	   Law	   School,	   Tel	   Aviv	  University	  Law	  School,	  University	  of	   Iowa	  Law	  School,	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Law	  School,	  and	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  School.	  Excellent	  research	  assistance	  on	   this	  paper	  and	  the	  larger	  book	  project	   undergirding	   it	  was	  provided	  by	  Rob	  Cobbs,	  Melissa	  Collins,	  Alex	  Hemmer,	  Erin	  Miller,	  Luke	  Norris,	  Daniel	  Schuker,	  Matt	  Smith,	  Elizabeth	  Wilkins,	  and	  Tom	  Wolf.	  	   1.	   ALBERT	   O.	   HIRSCHMAN,	   EXIT,	   VOICE,	   AND	   LOYALTY:	   RESPONSES	   TO	   DECLINE	   IN	   FIRMS,	  ORGANIZATIONS,	  AND	  STATES	  (1970).	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  Exit	   and	   voice	   are	   not,	   however,	   the	   only	   options	   available	   to	   a	  minority	  group	  seeking	  influence.	  That’s	  because	  much	  of	  the	  nation’s	  administrative	  structure	  looks	  more	  like	  Tocqueville’s	  democracy	  than	  Weber’s	   bureaucracy.	   In	   our	   highly	   decentralized	   and	   partially	  politicized	  system,	  minorities	  can	  wield	  influence	  over	  national	  policy	  because	   they	   routinely	   administer	   it.2	   State	   officials	   regularly	   run	  federal	   programs,	   often	   with	   governors	   and	   state	   legislators	   serving	  nominally	   bureaucratic	   roles.	   Federal	   policy	   is	   often	   implemented	   by	  local	   juries	   and	   local	   prosecutors,	   state	   and	   local	   school	   boards,	   and	  state-­‐created	   agencies.	   Because	   national	   minorities	   often	   constitute	  local	  majorities	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   these	   institutional	  arrangements	  ensure	  that	  those	  with	  outlier	  views	  help	  set	  federal	  policy.	  As	  policymaking	  insiders,	  minorities	  can	  resist	  federal	  policy	  from	  within	  rather	  than	  challenge	  it	  from	  without.	  A	  jury	  can	  nullify	  a	  law	  it	  dislikes.	   A	   state	   agency	   may	   be	   hostile	   to	   the	   federal	   law	   it	   is	  implementing.	  A	  school	  board	  can	  find	  ways	  to	  introduce	  religion	  into	  the	   classroom.	   Bureaucrats	  may	   administer	   an	   entitlements	   program	  in	  a	   less	  generous	   fashion	   than	   federal	  officials	  desire.	  Voice	  and	  exit	  thus	   aren’t	   the	   only	   paths	   of	   influence	   for	  minorities.	   Minorities	   can	  also	  exercise	  agency	   in	   their	  ongoing	  quarrel	  with	   the	  center	  because	  they	  are	  often	  the	  center’s	  agents.3	  Retooling	  Hirschman’s	  frame	  to	  include	  agency,	  then,	  doesn’t	  just	  draw	   our	   attention	   to	   an	   underappreciated	   avenue	   of	   minority	  influence.	   It	   raises	   questions	   as	   to	   why	   voice	   and	   exit	   have	   entirely	  dominated	  constitutional	  theory—why	  scholars	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  minority	   empowerment	  have	  overlooked	   the	   role	   that	   administrative	  arrangements	   can	   play	   in	   furthering	   that	   goal.	  We	   are	   all	   aware	   that	  bureaucrats	  wield	  power	  when	  they	  administer	  a	  program—we	  call	  it	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  And	  we	  are	  all	  aware	   that	   the	  principal-­‐agent	   problem	   can	   be	   particularly	   acute	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   partially	  politicized,	   highly	   decentralized	   system	   like	   our	   own.	   But	   the	  
productive	   possibilities	   associated	   with	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   problem	  have	  been	  neglected	  by	  constitutional	  theory.	  The	  notion	  of	  loyalty	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  explaining	  this	  neglect,	  though	  it	   isn’t	   the	   type	   of	   loyalty	   that	   Hirschman	   had	   in	   mind.	   Because	   we	  	  	   2.	   This	  is	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  center	  and	  the	  periphery.	  Here	  I’ll	   focus	   on	   minorities’	   influencing	   national	   policy,	   but	   the	   same	   basic	   arguments	   work	   with	  regard	  to	  minorities	  who	  wish	  to	  influence	  state	  policy.	  	   3.	   I	   thus	   use	   the	   term	   agency	   to	   refer	   to	   minorities’	   exercising	   control	   over	   the	  administration	   of	   national	   policy.	   I	   am	   intensely	   grateful	   to	   Tom	   Wolf	   for	   suggesting	   the	  formulation.	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  typically	   think	   of	   administrative	   arrangements	   in	   Weberian	   rather	  than	  Tocquevillian	  terms,	  we	  treat	  bureaucratic	  resistance	  as	  an	  act	  of	  disloyalty—as	   a	   problem	   to	   be	   solved	   rather	   than	   a	   feature	   to	   be	  celebrated.	  We	  laud	  federalism	  and	  the	  First	  Amendment	  because	  they	  ensure	  a	  healthy	  level	  of	  resistance	  to	  an	  overweening	  national	  power,	  but	   when	   minorities	   use	   their	   administrative	   muscle	   to	   challenge	  national	   policy	   from	   within,	   we	   worry	   about	   parochialism	   or	  lawlessness.	  We	  assume,	   in	   short,	   that	   the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	   is	  always	  a	  problem.	  That	  is	  a	  mistake.	  Although	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  certainly	  involves	   costs,	   these	   decentralized	   governing	   units	   constitute	   unique	  sites	   for	   minority	   influence.	   They	   blend	   features	   of	   voice	   and	   exit,	  offering	  minorities	  the	  decisionmaking	  control	  afforded	  by	  exit	  and	  the	  insider	   status	   associated	  with	   voice.	   Because	   agency	   gives	  minorities	  decisionmaking	   power	   within	   the	   federal	   system,	   it	   has	   unique	  implications	  for	  two	  of	  the	  most	  important	  projects	  undergirding	  much	  of	   constitutional	   theory:	   integrating	   a	   diverse	  polity	   and	   encouraging	  democratic	  debate.	  This	   Lecture	   is	   organized	   as	   follows.	   Part	   I	   explores	   the	  marked	  continuities	   between	   Hirschman’s	   frame	   and	   the	   strategies	   for	  empowering	   minorities	   that	   dominate	   constitutional	   theory.	   Part	   II	  explains	  why	  Hirschman’s	  third	  category,	  loyalty,	  is	  all	  but	  ignored	  by	  scholars	   and	  uses	   it	   as	   a	   starting	   place	   for	   identifying	   a	   third	   type	   of	  minority	  influence:	  agency.	  Part	  III	  returns	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  loyalty	  and	  considers	   why	   Hirschman—and	   most	   constitutional	   theorists—have	  neglected	   this	   important	   avenue	   of	   minority	   influence.	   Part	   IV	  identifies	   some	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   agency	   supplements,	  complements,	   and	   competes	   with	   voice	   and	   exit	   as	   a	   channel	   of	  minority	  influence.	  Two	   caveats	   are	   in	   order.	   First,	   in	   sketching	   out	   these	   claims,	   I	  necessarily	   offer	   some	   broad	   generalizations	   about	   the	   state	   of	  constitutional	  theory.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  exceptions	  to	  every	  rule,	  as	  the	  footnotes	  make	  clear.	  Second,	  many	  of	  the	  phenomena	  I	  discuss	  fall	  along	  a	  continuum.4	  For	  ease	  of	  exposition,	   I	  will	   sometimes	  speak	   in	  categorical	   terms.	   Although	   those	   terms	   roughly	   capture	   the	  	  	   4.	   For	   instance,	   in	   discussing	   conventional	   federalism,	   I	   talk	   about	   state	   officials	   as	  “outsiders”	   to	   the	   national	   scheme	   when,	   of	   course,	   they	   are	   differently	   situated	   than	   true	  outsiders,	  such	  as	  officials	  from	  another	  country.	  I	  nonetheless	  think	  the	  distinction	  is	  useful,	  as	  it	  provides	   a	  means	   for	   identifying	   the	  difference	  between,	   say,	   state	   officials	   administering	   state	  law	  and	  state	  officials	  administering	  federal	  law.	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  phenomena	   I’m	   describing	   at	   the	   level	   of	   generality	   I’m	   describing	  them,	  please	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  categories	  will	  inevitably	  blur	  at	  the	  margins	  and	  might	  disappear	  entirely	  if	  we	  kick	  the	  analysis	  up	  to	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  level	  of	  generality.	  I.	  EXIT	  AND	  VOICE	  In	   1970	   Hirschman	   penned	   his	   famous	   book,	   Exit,	   Voice,	   and	  
Loyalty.	  The	  book	  starts	  with	  a	  puzzle:	  “why	  the	  Nigerian	  railways	  had	  performed	   so	   poorly”	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   “active	   competition”	   from	  trucks.5	  Hirschman	  builds	  on	  his	  observations	  about	   firm	  behavior	   to	  offer	   a	   free-­‐form,	   wide-­‐ranging	   disquisition	   on	   the	   sources	   of	  institutional	  change—or,	  as	  his	  subtitle	  reads,	  on	  “responses	  to	  decline	  in	   firms,	   organization,	   and	   states.”	   The	   book	   is	   itself	   an	   interesting	  window	   into	   scholarly	   norms;	   people	   just	   don’t	   write	   like	   that	   any	  more.	  The	  idea	  that	  you	  could	  move	  from	  a	  Nigerian	  railroad	  to	  firms	  to	  political	  parties	  to	  states	  is	  a	  bit	  startling	  to	  anyone	  deeply	  steeped	  in	  current	  disciplinary	  norms.	  In	  spite	  of—or	  perhaps	  because	  of—its	  wide-­‐ranging,	  unbounded	  arguments,	   Hirschman’s	   account	   has	   become	   ubiquitous.	  Whether	   or	  not	  you	  accept	  his	  fox-­‐like	  asides,	  the	  hedgehog’s	  point	  has	  held	  fast—that	  one	  can	  influence	  an	  institution	  by	  exercising	  either	  voice	  or	  exit.	  If	   one	   takes	   up	   Hirschman’s	   firm	   example,6	   for	   instance,	   his	   analysis	  runs	  as	  follows:	  If	  your	  preferred	  soup	  manufacturer	  began	  offering	  a	  flawed	  product,	  what	  would	  you	  do?	  You	  could	   take	  advantage	  of	   the	  consumer’s	   exit	   option	   and	   buy	   a	   better	   soup	   from	   a	   competitor.	  Consumers’	   exiting	  would	   induce	   the	  management	   to	   change	   lest	   the	  company	  lose	  more	  revenue.	  Or	  you	  could	  exercise	  voice,	  complaining	  about	  the	  soup’s	  shortcomings	  and	  pushing	  the	  company	  to	  adapt.	  Hirschman’s	   typology	   has	   proved	   to	   be	   especially	   useful	   in	  framing	   a	   variety	   of	   debates	   related	   to	   democratic	   design.	   As	  Hirschman	  observes,	   notions	   like	   exit	   and	  voice	   easily	   translate	   from	  the	  economic	  context	  to	  the	  democratic	  one.7	  A	  voter,	  for	  instance,	  can	  push	  his	  political	  party	  to	  change	  by	  exiting—voting	  for	  the	  other	  party	  or	   just	   staying	   home.	   Or	   the	   voter	   can	   exercise	   voice,	   complaining	  about	  the	  party’s	  positions	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  spurring	  reform.8	  	  	   5.	   HIRSCHMAN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  44	  (emphasis	  omitted).	  	  	   6.	   Id.	  at	  3–4.	  	  	   7.	   Id.	  at	  17–19,	  70.	  	  	   8.	   Id.	  at	  30–33,	  69–70.	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  Unsurprisingly,	   Hirschman’s	   account	   is	   often	   invoked	   when	   we	  think	  about	  democratic	  arrangements,	  particularly	  when	  we	  are	  trying	  to	   answer	   that	   core	   question	   in	   constitutional	   theory:	   What	   does	   a	  democracy	   owe	   its	   minorities?	   Voice	   and	   exit	   offer	   deeply	   intuitive	  categories	   for	   classifying	   the	   dominant	  modalities	   we	   use	   to	   analyze	  the	   democratic	   influence	   that	   minorities	   wield.	   We	   see	   it	   on	   the	  structural	  side	  of	  constitutional	  theory,	  and	  we	  see	  it	  on	  the	  rights	  side	  as	  well.	  
A.	   Exit	  and	  Voice	  in	  Constitutional	  Theory	  Here’s	  a	  highly	  stylized	  typology,	  one	  that	  is	  plainly	  debatable	  but	  offers	  at	   least	  one	  reasonable	  way	  to	  get	   traction	  on	  these	   issues.	  For	  those	  strange	  creatures	  who	  think	  more	  clearly	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  two-­‐by-­‐two	  matrix,	  here’s	  what	  it	  looks	  like:	  	  
Table	  1.	  Mapping	  Constitutional	  Theory	  onto	  Hirschman’s	  Categories	  	   	  
Voice	   Exit	  
Rights	   Right to free speech	   Right of association	  
Structure	   Diversity/voting in a national election	   Federalism/voting in a state election	  	   	  1.	  Rights.	  	  Let’s	  start	  with	  the	  rights	  side	  of	  the	  equation.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  spot	  examples	  of	  voice	  and	  exit	  in	  the	  work	  of	  those	  who	  think	  about	  what	  rights	  a	  democracy	  owes	  its	  minorities.	  The	  right	  to	   free	  speech	  grants	   minorities	   voice—a	   chance	   to	   criticize	   national	   policy	   and	  perhaps	   to	   influence	   public	   debate.	   The	   First	   Amendment	   gives	  minorities	   a	   chance	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	   national	   conversation.	   Forests	  have	   been	   felled	   in	   the	   name	   of	   accounts	   of	   this	   sort.	   Indeed,	   the	  marketplace	   of	   ideas—one	   of	   the	   major	   theories	   undergirding	   First	  Amendment	  doctrine—is	  premised	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  right	  to	  speak	  allows	   dissenters	   to	   affect	   ongoing	   debates.	   Minorities	   may	   be	  outnumbered	  in	  this	  debate,	  but	  at	  least	  they	  will	  be	  heard.	  The	   First	   Amendment	   also	   offers	   minorities	   an	   exit	   option:	   the	  privacy	   afforded	  by	   the	   right	   to	   associate,	  which	   allows	  minorities	   to	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  exit	  the	  public	  sphere	  for	  the	  private	  one	  in	  order	  to	  govern	  themselves	  (mostly)	   as	   they	   see	   fit.9	   Although	   this	   exit	   option	   has	   typically	   been	  cast	   as	   a	   source	   of	   protection	   for	  minorities,	   it	   also	   fits	   Hirschman’s	  notion	  that	  exit	  constitutes	  a	  form	  of	  influence.	  If	  enough	  people	  leave	  the	   public	   for	   the	   private,	   the	   hope	   is	   that	   this	   exodus	   will	   cause	  policymakers	  to	  adapt.10	  In	  some	  instances,	  exit	  also	  offers	  minorities	  a	  type	   of	   influence	   that	   Hirschman	   did	   not	   contemplate.	   It	   allows	  minorities	  to	  model	  an	  alternative	  policymaking	  vision	  to	  convince	  the	  center	   of	   its	   merits,	   or	   at	   least	   its	   viability.	   It	   is	   precisely	   when	  minorities	   are	   unhappy	   with	   the	   regime	   public	   governance	   has	  produced	  that	  they	  turn	  to	  private	  governance,	  where	  they	  are	  outside	  the	  system	  and	  can	   thus	  pursue	   their	  own	  utopias.	  The	  Amish	  are,	  of	  course,	   the	   canonical	   example,	   but	   there	   are	   examples	   everywhere.	  Parochial	   schools,	   for	   instance,	   show	   us	   what	   a	   religiously	   inflected	  education	   looks	   like.	   Private	   organizations	   favoring	   gay	   rights	   offer	  members	   of	   the	   LGBT	   community	   a	   different	   experience	   from	   that	  offered	   by	   a	   society	   that	   often	   discriminates	   against	   them.	   Private	  universities	   can	   adopt	   policies	   that	   public	   ones	   cannot.	   These	  alternative	  models	  are	  protected	  precisely	  because	   these	  associations	  are	   private	   and	   thus	   outside	   the	   government’s	   reach.	   And	  minorities	  can	  pursue	  a	  different	  course	  precisely	  because	   they	  enjoy	  majorities	  within	  these	  private	  organizations—they	  are	  not	  outnumbered,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  2.	  Structure.	  	  Exit	  and	  voice	  are	  also	  easy	  to	  spot	  on	  the	  structural	  side	  of	  constitutional	  theory.	  On	  the	  exit	  side,	  we	  have	  federalism.11	  At	  first	  glance,	   this	  claim	  might	  seem	  a	  bit	   startling	  because,	   if	  anything,	  we	   conventionally	   associate	   decentralization	   with	   voice	   rather	   than	  	  	   9.	   For	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   exit	   and	   association	   that	   pursues	  different	   arguments	   than	   those	   offered	   here,	   see	   Evelyn	   Brody,	   Entrance,	   Voice,	   and	   Exit:	   The	  
Constitutional	  Bounds	  of	  the	  Right	  of	  Association,	  35	  U.C.	  DAVIS	  L.	  REV.	  821	  (2002).	  	   10.	   Think,	   for	   instance,	   about	   public	   schools.	   I	   draw	   this	   example	   from	   HIRSCHMAN,	   supra	  note	  1,	  at	  45–47.	  	   11.	   See,	  e.g.,	  ILYA	  SOMIN,	  DEMOCRACY	  AND	  POLITICAL	  IGNORANCE	  (forthcoming	  2013)	  (on	  file	  with	  the	  Duke	  Law	  Journal);	  Richard	  A.	  Epstein,	  Exit	  Rights	  Under	  Federalism,	  55	  LAW	  &	  CONTEMP.	  PROBS.	  147,	   149	   (1992);	   Barry	   Friedman,	   Valuing	   Federalism,	   82	   MINN.	   L.	   REV.	   317,	   386–405	   (1997);	  Clayton	  Gillette,	  The	  Exercise	  of	  Trumps	  by	  Decentralized	  Governments,	  83	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  1347,	  1347–52,	  1408–17	  (1997);	  Daryl	  J.	  Levinson,	  Rights	  and	  Votes,	  121	  YALE	  L.J.	  1286,	  1355	  (2012);	  John	  O.	  McGinnis	   &	   Ilya	   Somin,	   Federalism	   v.	   States’	   Rights:	   A	   Defense	   of	   Judicial	   Review	   in	   a	   Federal	  
System,	   99	   NW.	   U.	   L.	   REV.	   89–105,	   110–12	   (2004);	   Ernest	   A.	   Young,	  The	   Rehnquist	   Court’s	   Two	  
Federalisms,	   83	   TEX.	   L.	   REV.	   1,	   60	   (2004);	   cf.	   Jonathan	   R.	   Macey,	   Federal	   Deference	   to	   Local	  
Regulators	   and	   the	   Economic	   Theory	   of	   Regulation:	   Toward	   a	   Public-­‐Choice	   Explanation	   of	  
Federalism,	  76	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  265,	  273	  (1990).	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  exit.12	   The	   intuition	   is	   that	   by	   pushing	   decisions	   down	   from	   the	  national	   to	   the	   state	   (or	   local)	   level,	   we	   give	   individuals	   more	   of	   a	  chance	  to	  make	  their	  opinions	  known.	  If	   one	   thinks	   about	   federalism’s	   place	   in	   democratic	   theory,	  however,	  exit	  is	  a	  better	  way	  to	  describe	  it.13	  That’s	  because	  federalism	  is	  at	  least	  in	  part	  a	  theory	  about	  what	  a	  democracy	  should	  do	  with	  its	  minorities.	  It’s	  a	  strategy	  for	  dealing	  with—even	  leveraging—diversity.	  All	   but	   one	  or	   two	  minor	   theories	   of	   federalism	   turn	  on	   the	   fact	   that	  national	  minorities	  constitute	  local	  majorities.	  States,	  for	  instance,	  are	  unlikely	   to	   constitute	   laboratories	   of	   democracy	   or	   facilitate	  Tieboutian	   sorting14	   if	   the	   same	   types	   of	   people	   are	   making	   the	  decisions	  at	   the	  state	  and	   federal	   level.	  Similarly,	  ambition	   is	  unlikely	  to	  counteract	  ambition	   if	   state	  and	  national	  actors	  are	  united	   in	   their	  ambitions.	  If	   one	   thinks	   of	   federalism	   as	   a	   strategy	   for	   explaining	   what	   a	  democracy	  owes	   its	  minorities,	   it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  most	  theories	  of	  federalism	   stand	   in	   loosely	   for	   an	   idea	   that	   the	   best	   way	   to	   protect	  minorities	   in	   a	   majoritarian	   system	   is	   to	   give	   them	   an	   exit	   option,	  making	  space	  for	  them	  to	  enact	  their	  own	  policies	  separate	  and	  apart	  from	   the	   center.15	   That	   is	  why	   some	   think	   that	   the	   very	   definition	   of	  federalism	   requires	   state	   sovereignty,16	   and	   most	   assume	   that	   it	   at	  least	  demands	  a	  fairly	  high	  level	  of	  informal	  autonomy	  for	  states.17	  
	  	   12.	   Thanks	  to	  Richard	  Briffault	   for	  offering	  this	  formulation	  of	  what	  he	  takes	  (correctly)	  to	  be	  the	  conventional	  account	  in	  constitutional	  theory.	  	   13.	   Some	  of	  these	  arguments	  are	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail,	  albeit	  from	  a	  different	  angle,	  in	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken,	  Foreword,	  Federalism	  All	  the	  Way	  Down,	  124	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  4,	  11–28	  (2010).	  	   14.	   See	  generally	  Charles	  M.	  Tiebout,	  A	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Local	  Expenditures,	  64	  J.	  POL.	  ECON.	  416	  (1956).	  	   15.	   Exit,	  of	  course,	  is	  partial	  in	  the	  federalism	  context.	  As	  I	  note	  above,	  minorities	  are	  partial	  outsiders	  in	  the	  federalism	  context.	  See	  supra	  note	  4.	  A	  full-­‐exit	  option	  would	  presumably	  involve	  some	  form	  of	  secession.	  	  	   16.	   See,	  e.g.,	  WILLIAM	  H.	  RIKER,	  FEDERALISM:	  ORIGIN,	  OPERATION,	  SIGNIFICANCE	  11	  (1964);	  Frank	  B.	  Cross,	  The	  Folly	  of	  Federalism,	  24	  CARDOZO	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  19	  (2002).	  	   17.	   See,	  e.g.,	  MALCOLM	  M.	  FEELEY	  &	  EDWARD	  RUBIN,	  FEDERALISM:	  POLITICAL	  IDENTITY	  AND	  TRAGIC	  COMPROMISE	   12	   (2008);	   Bradford	   R.	   Clark,	   The	   Procedural	   Safeguards	   of	   Federalism,	   83	   NOTRE	  DAME	   L.	   REV.	   1681,	   1681	   (2008);	   Larry	   D.	   Kramer,	   Putting	   the	   Politics	   Back	   into	   the	   Political	  
Safeguards	   of	   Federalism,	   100	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   215,	   222	   (2000);	   Larry	   Kramer,	   Understanding	  
Federalism,	   47	   VAND.	   L.	   REV.	   1485,	   1513	   (1994);	   D.	   Bruce	   La	   Pierre,	  The	   Political	   Safeguards	   of	  
Federalism	  Redux:	  Intergovernmental	  Immunity	  and	  the	  States	  as	  Agents	  of	  the	  Nation,	  60	  WASH.	  U.	  L.Q.	   779,	   786	   (1982);	   Andrzej	   Rapaczynski,	   From	   Sovereignty	   to	   Process:	   The	   Jurisprudence	   of	  
Federalism	   After	   Garcia,	   1985	   SUP.	   CT.	   REV.	   341,	   416;	   Ernest	   A.	   Young,	   Two	   Cheers	   for	   Process	  
Federalism,	  46	  VILL.	  L.	  REV.	  1349,	  1349,	  1358	  n.42,	  1385	  (2001).	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   to	   compare	   federalism	   to	   its	   First	   Amendment	  cognate,	   the	   right	   to	   associate.	   We	   protect	   the	   right	   to	   associate	  precisely	  because	  we	  want	  to	  ensure	  that	  groups	  can	  create	  their	  own	  utopias.	   Autonomy	   creates	   space	   for	   disuniformity	   and	   dissent.	   The	  notion	   of	   autonomy	   has	   just	   as	  much	   pull	   on	   the	   structural	   side.	  We	  value	   it	   because	   it	   prevents	   the	   national	   majority	   from	   imposing	   its	  preference	   on	   local	  majorities.	   Just	   as	   the	   First	   Amendment	   protects	  minorities’	   exit	   option	   on	   the	   rights	   side,	   sovereignty	   and	   autonomy	  protect	  minorities’	  exit	  option	  on	  the	  structural	  side.	  Federalism’s	  emphasis	  on	  exit	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  scholars’	  failure	  to	  push	   federalism	   theory	   all	   the	   way	   down	   to	   juries,	   school	   boards,	  zoning	   commissions,	   state	   agencies,	   locally	   elected	   sheriffs,	   and	   the	  like.18	   Given	   its	   focus	   on	  minority-­‐dominated	   governance,	   you	  might	  think	   that	   federalism	   would	   naturally	   look	   to	   local,	   substate,	   and	  sublocal	  institutions	  as	  sites	  of	  minority	  rule.	  After	  all,	  given	  that	  most	  states	  are	  fairly	  populous,	  minorities	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  ruling	  at	  the	   local	   level.	   But	  while	   some	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	   federalism	  should	  extend	  to	  cities,19	  they	  have	  not	  carried	  that	  insight	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion	   and	   included	   special-­‐purpose,	   administrative	   units	   within	  federalism’s	  ambit.20	  The	   reason	   for	   this	  neglect,	   in	  my	  view,	   is	   the	   salience	  of	   exit	   to	  federalism	   theory.	   These	   administrative	   units	   seem	   unlikely	   sites	   for	  “Our	   Federalism”	   to	   anyone	   influenced	   by	   an	   exit	   account.	   An	   exit	  account	   pivots	   off	   an	   image	   of	   minorities’	   presiding	   over	   their	   own	  empires	   rather	   than	   administering	   someone	   else’s;	   it	   focuses	   on	   the	  power	   of	   minorities	   to	   put	   in	   place	   policies	   that	   the	   center	   cannot	  touch.	  Administrative	  units	  are,	  almost	  by	  definition,	  not	  sites	  for	  exit.	  They	  are	  part	  of	   the	   system,	  not	  outside	  of	   it.	  While	  minorities	  wield	  control,	   the	   power	   they	   wield	   is	   not	   their	   own.	  When	  minorities	   set	  policy	   within	   these	   administrative	   units,	   they	   aren’t	   setting	   policies	  that	   are	   shielded	   from	   the	   center;	   they	   are	   setting	   policies	   for	   the	  center.	  One	  might	  respond	  that	   the	  neglect	  of	   these	  administrative	  units	  has	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	  exit.	  Federalism	   is,	  by	  definition,	  about	  states;	  it’s	  a	  definition	  rooted	   in	   the	   text	  and	  history	  of	   the	  Constitution.	  But	  	  	   18.	   Gerken,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  22.	  	   19.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Richard	   Briffault,	   “What	   About	   the	   ‘Ism’?”	   Normative	   and	   Formal	   Concerns	   in	  
Contemporary	  Federalism,	  47	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  1303,	  1304	  (1994).	  Many	  have	  extended	  the	  insights	  of	  federalism	  to	  cities.	  See	  id.	  at	  1304–05,	  1310–16	  (collecting	  sources).	  	   20.	   Gerken,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  22–27.	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  that	  response	  is	  too	  simple.	  For	  better	  or	  for	  worse,	  federalism	  theory	  has	  moved	  well	   beyond	   arguments	   about	   the	   text	   and	   history	   of	   the	  Constitution,	   arguments	   that	   would	   naturally	   confine	   theories	   of	  federalism	  to	  states.	  Instead,	  federalism	  theory	  now	  largely	  turns	  on	  a	  set	   of	   functional	   justifications	   for	   valuing	  minority	   rule.21	   And	   if	   one	  thinks	   only	   about	   the	   functional,	   it’s	   quite	   natural	   to	   think	   about	  federalism’s	   values	   for	   institutions	   below	   the	   state	   level.	   That’s	   why	  scholars	  have	  already	  proposed	  grouping	  cities	  with	  states	  in	  thinking	  about	   federalism.22	  But	   although	   scholars	   have	  moved	  beyond	   states,	  they	  have	  stopped	  with	  cities.23	  That’s	  not	  a	   coincidence.	  Cities	  are	   the	  one	  other	   institution	   that	  can	  conceivably	  offer	  a	  robust	  exit	  option.24	  Like	  states,	   they	  are	  sites	  of	  general	  jurisdiction—units	  where	  we	  can	  imagine	  minorities’	  ruling	  themselves,	  separate	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  center.	  Like	  states,	  cities	  enjoy	  some	  level	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  autonomy,25	  so	  that	  minorities	  who	  govern	   them	   can	   meaningfully	   be	   understood	   as	   presiding	   over	  empires	  of	   their	  own.	  And	  notice	  what	   remains	  outside	  of	   federalism	  theory.	  It’s	  the	  substate	  and	  sublocal	  institutions	  that	  constitute	  states	  	  	   21.	   Federalism,	   for	   instance,	   is	   thought	   to	   promote	   choice,	   competition,	   participation,	  experimentation,	   and	   the	   diffusion	   of	   power.	   E.g.,	   Gregory	   v.	   Ashcroft,	   501	   U.S.	   452,	   458–59	  (1991);	  see	  also	  Akhil	  Reed	  Amar,	  Five	  Views	  of	  Federalism:	  “Converse-­‐1983”	  in	  Context,	  47	  VAND.	  L.	   REV.	   1229	   (1994);	   Lynn	   A.	   Baker	  &	   Ernest	   A.	   Young,	  Federalism	   and	   the	   Double	   Standard	   of	  
Judicial	   Review,	   51	  DUKE	   L.J.	   75,	   136–39	   (2001);	   Steven	   G.	   Calabresi,	   “A	   Government	   of	   Limited	  
and	   Enumerated	   Powers”:	   In	   Defense	   of	   United	   States	   v.	   Lopez,	   94	   MICH.	   L.	   REV.	   752,	   774–79	  (1995);	  Deborah	  Jones	  Merritt,	  The	  Guarantee	  Clause	  and	  State	  Autonomy:	  Federalism	  for	  a	  Third	  
Century,	   88	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   1,	   3–10	   (1988);	   Young,	   supra	   note	   11,	   at	   52–63;	   Michael	   W.	  McConnell,	   Federalism:	   Evaluating	   the	   Founders’	   Design,	   54	   U.	   CHI.	   L.	   REV.	   1484,	   1491–1511	  (1987)	  (reviewing	  RAOUL	  BERGER,	  FEDERALISM:	  THE	  FOUNDERS’	  DESIGN	  (1987)).	  Some	  believe	  we	  reel	   these	   arguments	   off	   too	   easily.	   See	   Barry	   Friedman,	   Valuing	   Federalism,	   82	   MINN.	   L.	   REV.	  317,	  318–19	  (1997).	  	  	   22.	   Richard	   Briffault	  makes	   precisely	   this	   point.	   Briffault,	   supra	   note	   19,	   at	   1305;	   see	   also	  Mark	  C.	  Gordon,	  Differing	  Paradigms,	  Similar	  Flaws:	  Constructing	  a	  New	  Approach	   to	  Federalism	  
in	  Congress	  and	  the	  Court,	  14	  YALE	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  REV.	  187,	  218	  (1996).	  	  	   23.	   Richard	   Briffault	   is	   the	   exception,	   as	   he	   has	   written	   on	   economic	   institutions	   at	   the	  sublocal	   level.	   See	   generally,	   e.g.,	   Richard	   Briffault,	   A	   Government	   for	   Our	   Time?	   Business	  
Improvement	   Districts	   and	   Urban	   Governance,	   99	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   365	   (1999);	   Richard	   Briffault,	  
The	  Rise	  of	  Sublocal	  Structures	  in	  Urban	  Governance,	  82	  MINN.	  L.	  REV.	  503	  (1997).	  	   24.	   How	   robust	   an	   exit	   option	   they	   offer	   is	   up	   for	   debate.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Richard	   Briffault,	   Our	  
Localism:	  Part	  I—The	  Structure	  of	  Local	  Government	  Law,	  90	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  5	  (1990);	  Gerald	  E.	  Frug,	  The	  City	  as	  a	  Legal	  Concept,	  93	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1057,	  1069–72	  (1980).	  	   25.	   Many	  cities	  enjoy	  “home	  rule”	  provisions	  whose	  utility	   is	  a	  subject	  of	   intense	  debate	   in	  local	  government	  law.	  Compare	  David	  J.	  Barron,	  Reclaiming	  Home	  Rule,	  116	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  2257,	  2263	  (2003),	  David	   J.	  Barron	  &	  Gerald	  E.	  Frug,	  Defensive	  Localism:	  A	  View	  of	   the	  Field	   from	  the	  
Field,	  21	  J.L.	  &	  POL.	  261,	  261–62	  (2005),	  and	  Frug,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  1059–60,	  with	  Briffault,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  7.	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   cities—juries,	   school	   committees,	   zoning	   commissions,	   locally	  elected	  prosecutors,	  and	  the	  like.	  These	  are	  the	  institutions	  where	  exit	  is	  not	  to	  be	  had.	  As	  with	   the	   right	   to	   associate,	   federalism	   is	   not	   just	   a	   source	   of	  protection	   for	  minorities.	   It	   also	  offers	  minorities	  a	  path	  of	   influence.	  First,	  consistent	  with	  Hirschman’s	  account,	  minorities	  can	  signal	  their	  unhappiness	  with	  national	  policies	  by	  pursuing	  different	  policies	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  Second,	  minorities	  can	  dissent	  by	  deciding;26	  they	  can	  offer	  a	   real-­‐life	   instantiation	   of	   their	   ideas	   by,	   say,	   licensing	   same-­‐sex	  couples	  to	  marry	  or	  enacting	  strict	  abortion	  laws.	  We	   also	   see	   the	   voice	   model	   on	   the	   structural	   side.	   It’s	   the	  diversity	  model—an	  institutional-­‐design	  strategy	  often	  invoked	  by	  the	  nationalists,	   who	   are	   deeply	   skeptical	   of	   federalism.	   Here	   again,	   this	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  startling	  claim	  at	  first.	  Diversity	  and	  federalism	  are	  not	  typically	   paired	   in	   this	   fashion.	   But,	   again,	   if	   one	   views	   these	  institutional	   design	   strategies	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   democratic	   theory,	  diversity	   is	   properly	   understood	   as	   a	   strategy	   that	   grants	  minorities	  “voice”	  in	  the	  decisionmaking	  process.	  Here	  I	  think	  the	  argument	  is	  easiest	  to	  understand	  if	  we	  back	  into	  it	   and	   start	   by	   thinking	   in	   institutional	   terms	   about	   what	   a	  conventional	  nationalist	  thinks	  a	  democracy	  owes	  its	  minorities.	  What	  is	  federalism’s	  institutional	  competitor?	  Proponents	  of	  federalism	  and	  nationalism	  both	  favor	  a	  basic	  baseline	  of	  rights.	  But	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  structure,	  nationalists—disgusted	  with	  federalism’s	  past—gravitate	  to	  an	  idea	  familiar	  to	  all	  of	  us:	  the	  diversity	  paradigm.	  The	  idea	  is	  simple	  and	   intuitive:	   that	   decisionmaking	   bodies	   ought	   to	   mirror	   the	  population	   from	   which	   they	   are	   drawn—they	   ought	   to	   look	   like	  America,	  to	  use	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  favorite	  phrase.	  Diversity	   is	   the	   rough	   cognate	   to	   the	   voice	   model.	   It	   offers	  minorities	  a	  subset	  of	  seats	  or	  votes	  on	  every	  decisionmaking	  body.	  It	  thus	  gives	  minorities	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  their	  views	  heard,	  even	  if	  they	  can’t	  control	  the	  outcome.	  Indeed,	  proponents	  of	  diversity	  often	  invoke	   the	   “dignity	   of	   voice”	   in	   making	   the	   pitch	   for	   including	  minorities	  on	  various	  decisionmaking	  bodies.27	  
	  	   26.	   See	  generally	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken,	  Dissenting	  by	  Deciding,	  57	  STAN.	  L.	  REV.	  1745	  (2005).	  	   27.	   See,	  e.g.,	  ANNE	  PHILLIPS,	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  PRESENCE	  79	  (1995);	  Jane	  Mansbridge,	  Should	  
Blacks	   Represent	   Blacks	   and	  Women	   Represent	  Women?	   A	   Contingent	   “Yes,”	   61	   J.	   POL.	   628,	   628	  (1999);	   Charles	   Taylor,	   The	   Politics	   of	   Recognition,	   in	   MULTICULTURALISM:	   EXAMINING	   THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  RECOGNITION	  25,	  25	  (Amy	  Gutmann	  ed.,	  1994).	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  3.	   The	  Voting	  Conundrum.	   	  One	  might,	   of	   course,	  balk	   at	   the	  way	  I’ve	   classified	   these	   structural	   arrangements.	   The	   right	   to	   speak	   and	  the	   right	   to	   associate	  map	  pretty	  neatly	   onto	  Hirschman’s	   categories.	  But	   structural	   arrangements	   fit	   more	   loosely.	   While	   Hirschman	  imagined	  that	  voters	  could	  “exit”	  their	  party	  by	  voting	  for	  a	  competing	  party,	   one	   might	   still	   insist	   that	   voting	   under	   the	   diversity	   model	  shouldn’t	   be	   equated	   with	   “voice.”	   After	   all,	   when	   you	   vote,	   you	   are	  part	  of	  the	  decisionmaking	  process,	  not	  just	  complaining	  about	  it.	  Fair	  enough.	  The	  typology	  is,	  as	  I	  said,	  a	  loose	  one,	  and	  Hirschman	  himself	   didn’t	   identify	   exactly	   how	  voting	   fits	   into	   his	   scheme.	   If	   you	  think	   voting	   absolutely	   disqualifies	   structural	   arrangements	   from	  being	  included	  in	  Hirschman’s	  typology,	  you	  can	  stop	  here.	  But	  there’s	  good	   reason	   for	   a	   bit	   of	   flexibility	   here.	   While	   voting	   is	   a	   pervasive	  feature	   on	   the	   structural	   side,	   there	   are	   different	   variants	   of	   voting,	  and	  Hirschman’s	  scheme	  helps	  us	  map	  them.	  One	   can,	   for	   instance,	   make	   a	   sensible	   case	   that,	   at	   least	   for	  political	  minorities,28	  voting	  under	  the	  diversity	  paradigm	  looks	  a	  good	  deal	  like	  voice.	  Political	  minorities	  are,	  by	  definition,	  the	  losers	  when	  a	  national	   vote	   is	   taken.	   If	   political	   minorities	   didn’t	   vote	   at	   all,	   the	  decision	   would	   still	   get	   made,	   and	   it	   would	   still	   be	   a	   decision	   they	  oppose.	   Voting	   in	   this	   context	   is	   a	   form	   of	   protest—a	   way	   to	   signal	  unhappiness	   with	   the	   decision.	   This	   signal	   may	   influence	   future	  debates,	  but	  it	  won’t	  affect	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  table.29	  Similarly,	  voting	  under	  federalism	  looks	  a	   lot	   like	  exit.	  As	  I	  noted	  above,	  we	  conventionally	  think	  that	  pushing	  an	  issue	  down	  to	  the	  state	  level	  gives	  minorities	  more	  “voice”	  over	  the	  decision.	  When	  people	  use	  the	   term	   voice,	   they	   are	   really	   thinking	   about	   influence.	   But	  Hirschman’s	  key	  insight	  is	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  avenues	  of	  influence.	  And	  there	  is	  a	  crucial	  difference	  between	  voting	  and	  “voting	  with	  one’s	   feet”—between	   the	  diversity	  model	   and	   federalism.	  Under	  the	   diversity	   model,	   minorities	   inevitably	   cast	   a	   losing	   vote.	  Federalism,	   in	   contrast,	   gives	   minorities	   the	   chance	   to	  win—to	   form	  local	  majorities	  and	  exercise	  a	  decisive	  vote	  rather	  than	  merely	  “voice”	  	  	   28.	   To	  be	  sure,	  one	  might	  resist	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  classification	  may	  work	  only	   for	  political	  minorities.	  Hirschman’s	  arguments	  are	  cast	  in	  individualist	  terms.	  To	  the	  extent	  he	  contemplates	  group	   action,	   he	   assumes	   that	   voters	   and	   consumers	   will	   take	   a	   roughly	   similar	   view	   of	   the	  problem.	   The	   variation	   on	   which	   Hirschman	   focuses	   is	   the	   different	   ways	   people	   react	   to	   an	  agreed-­‐upon	  problem.	  	   29.	   Unless,	  of	  course,	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  smaller	  decisionmaking	  bodies,	  where	  dissenters	  may	  trade	  away	  their	  dissenting	  votes	   in	  exchange	   for	  compromises	   from	  the	  majority.	  Gerken,	  
supra	  note	  26,	  at	  1746–47.	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  their	   concerns.	   What	   some	   term	   “voice”	   is	   better	   understood	   as	  control.	  Note,	   however,	   that	   under	   conventional	   models	   of	   federalism	  minorities	   don’t	   exercise	   control	   over	   national	   policy;	   they	   exercise	  control	  over	  state	  policy.	  The	  price	  of	  the	  power	  to	  control	  is	  outsider	  status.	   Unlike	   the	   diversity	  model	   and	   the	   right	   to	   free	   speech,	   it’s	   a	  form	   of	   influence	   available	   only	   outside	   the	   national	   sphere.	   It	   thus	  bears	   a	   close	   resemblance	   to	   the	   right	   to	   associate,	   which	   grants	  minorities	   the	   power	   to	   govern	   themselves	   only	   when	   they	   move	  outside	  the	  public	  sphere	  to	  the	  private	  one.	  
	  
***	  
	  No	   matter	   where	   we	   look,	   then,	   voice	   and	   exit	   capture	   the	  dominant	   modalities	   for	   thinking	   about	   what	   avenues	   of	   influence	   a	  democracy	   owes	   its	   minorities.	  While	   Hirschman	   didn’t	   invent	   these	  ideas,	   he	   offered	   a	   deeply	   intuitive	   framework	   for	   sorting	   and	  comparing	   them.	  Little	  wonder,	   then,	   that	  Hirschman’s	  categories	  are	  so	  often	  invoked	  by	  constitutional	  theorists.	  II.	  RETHINKING	  HIRSCHMAN’S	  FRAMEWORK	  
A.	   What	  About	  Loyalty?	  For	   all	   of	   Hirschman’s	   success	   with	   voice	   and	   exit,	   his	   third	  category—loyalty—turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  bust.	  Just	  ask	  yourself	  this:	  Can	  you	  even	  remember	  what	  Hirschman	  said	  about	  loyalty?	  In	  an	  informal	  survey	  of	   colleagues,	   I’ve	   found	   that	   even	   those	  who	   can	   recite	  other	  parts	   of	   the	   book,	   chapter	   and	   verse,	   often	   have	   only	   the	   vaguest	   of	  ideas	  about	  what	  Hirschman	  said	  about	  loyalty.	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  of	  the	   scholarly	   literature.	   The	   vast	   majority	   of	   citations	   to	   Hirschman	  emphasize	  exit	  and/or	  voice,	  as	  if	  the	  third	  word	  of	  the	  book’s	  title	  had	  been	  excised.	  Hirschman	   was	   admittedly	   somewhat	   imprecise	   in	   his	  formulation.	  But	  I	  think	  our	  collective	  amnesia	  is	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   Hirschman	   cast	   loyalty	   as	   a	   cushion	   against	   hasty	   exits.30	   The	  notion	  of	  loyalty	  helped	  Hirschman	  think	  about	  why	  everyone	  doesn’t	  just	   take	   the	   easy	   exit	   option—why	   some	   cling	   to	   a	   brand	   or	   an	  
	  	   30.	   See	  HIRSCHMAN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  78.	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  organization	   in	   the	  hope	   that	   voice	  will	   eventually	  put	   it	   back	  on	   the	  right	  track.	  You	  can	  see	  why	  Hirschman,	  the	  economist,	  might	  worry.	  As	  long	  as	   you	   know	   there’s	   a	   decent	   competitor	   out	   there,	   exit	   is	   usually	  easier—or	   at	   least	  more	   certain—than	   voice.	   Animating	  Hirschman’s	  account	   of	   loyalty	   is	   a	   worry	   about	   what	   happens	   when	   an	  organization	   screws	   up	   and	   exit	   is	   easy.31	   Customers	   might	   exit	   en	  
masse	   when	   a	   firm	  makes	   its	   first	   bad	   product,	   and	   a	   perfectly	   good	  company	  would	  never	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  recover.	  You	  can	  see	  the	  worry	  on	  the	  political	  side	  as	  well	  (though	  here	  it	  seems	  less	  realistic).	  If	  exit	  is	   too	   prevalent,	   running	   one	   lousy	   candidate	   will	   sink	   the	   party,	  leaving	   nothing	   in	   its	   wake.	   Loyalty	   raises	   the	   cost	   of	   exit	   and	   thus	  cushions	  the	  potential	  blow	  that	  exit	  can	  inflict.	  I	  have	  no	  quarrels	  with	  Hirschman’s	  account	  of	  loyalty.	  But	  I	  think	  the	   reason	   people	   forget	   this	   part	   of	   the	   book	   is	   that	   loyalty,	   in	  Hirschman’s	   view,	   wasn’t	   an	   avenue	   of	   influence;	   it	   was	   a	   cushion	  against	  it.	  Although	  Hirschman	  thought	  loyalty	  would	  dampen	  influence,	  one	  can	   find	   stray	   references	   in	   his	   work	   that	   hint	   of	   a	   quite	   different	  possibility—the	   possibility	   that	   there	   might	   be	   another	   avenue	   of	  influence	   beyond	   voice	   and	   exit.	   If	   you	   read	   Hirschman	   closely,	   he	  drops	  interesting	  observations	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  loyalty	  and	   influence.	   He	   notes	   in	   passing	   that	   those	   most	   loyal	   to	   the	  organization	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   have	   their	   voices	   heard	   by	   its	  management.32	  At	  some	  points	  in	  the	  book,	  he	  vaguely	  links	  loyalty	  to	  membership	   and	   decisionmaking—momentarily	   moving	   away	   from	  the	   passive,	   consumer-­‐oriented	   account	   he	   deploys	   in	   most	   of	   the	  book—and	   ever	   so	   briefly	   contemplates	   that	   members	   might	   have	  some	  direct	  role	  in	  the	  decisionmaking	  process.33	  Admittedly,	   the	   bits	   and	   pieces	   I’m	  discussing	   aren’t	   really	  what	  Hirschman	  meant	  by	  loyalty,	  and	  his	  observations	  along	  these	  lines	  are	  fragmentary	  and	  largely	  unexplored.	  But	  they	  nonetheless	  point	  up	  the	  possibility	   of	   taking	   Hirschman’s	   framework	   in	   a	   different	   direction,	  one	  that	  pivots	  off	  notions	   like	   loyalty,	  membership,	  and	  belonging	   in	  thinking	  about	  channels	  of	  democratic	  influence.	  
	  	   31.	   Id.	  at	  79.	  	   32.	   See	  id.	  at	  77.	  	   33.	   Cf.	  id.	  at	  98–105.	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B.	   A	  Third	  Avenue	  of	  Influence:	  Agency	  1.	  National	  Minorities	  As	  National	  Agents.	   	  In	  order	  to	  think	  about	  this	  third	  avenue	  of	  minority	  influence,	  we	  need	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  notion	  that	  dominates	  Hirschman’s	  thinking.	  He	  writes	  as	  if	  everyday	  citizens	  were	   situated	   politically	   much	   as	   they	   are	   economically—atomized,	  largely	  passive	  consumers	  of	  whatever	  political	  products	  are	  offered	  to	  them.	  Hirschman	  imagines	  voters	  having	  little	  to	  do	  in	  the	  democratic	  process	  save	  accept	  or	  reject	  the	  positions	  forged	  by	  political	  elites.	  What	  Hirschman’s	   account	  misses	   is	   that	   citizens	   don’t	   just	   vote	  on	  competing	  visions	  of	  what	  national	  policy	  ought	  to	  look	  like.	  In	  our	  highly	  decentralized	  and	  partially	  politicized	  bureaucracy,	  citizens	  help	  
make	  national	  policy.	  Citizens	  do	  so	  directly	  when	  they	  serve	  on	  juries,	  sit	   on	   locally	   oriented	   school	   boards	   and	   zoning	   commissions,	   or	  function	   as	   “street-­‐level	   bureaucrats.”34	   And	   they	   do	   so	   indirectly	   by	  electing	  state	  and	  local	  politicians	  who	  serve	  a	  nominally	  bureaucratic	  role	  and	  thus	  can	  staff	  more	  (or	  less)	  cooperative	  agencies	  to	  carry	  out	  federal	  policy.35	  The	   fact	   that	   citizens	   implement	   federal	   policy	   indirectly	   or	  directly	  wouldn’t	  much	  matter	   to	   those	   concerned	  with	   the	   influence	  minorities	  wield	  in	  a	  democracy	  but	  for	  one	  fact:	  residential	  patterns	  in	  this	  country	  are	  lumpy.	  In	  many	  places,	  national	  minorities	  constitute	  local	   majorities.	   This	   means	   that	   in	   some	   parts	   of	   the	   system,	  minorities	   wield	   control	   over	   the	   national	   policymaking	   apparatus,	  giving	  minorities	  an	  opportunity	  to	  administer	  the	  very	  federal	  policies	  with	  which	  they	  disagree.	  Minorities	  thus	  have	  lots	  of	  opportunities	  for	  setting	  policy	  rather	  than	  merely	  complaining	  about	  it—lots	  of	  opportunities	  for	  controlling	  federal	   law	   from	   within	   rather	   than	   challenging	   it	   from	   without.	  Precisely	   because	   minorities	   serve	   as	   the	   center’s	   agents,	   minorities	  can	  do	  more	   than	   exercise	   voice	  or	   exit	  when	   they	  disagree	  with	   the	  center’s	  policies:	  they	  can	  exercise	  agency.	  Our	   system	   is	   rife	   with	   examples	   of	   one	   set	   of	   decisionmakers	  setting	   policy	   at	   the	   center	   and	   another,	   quite	   different,	   set	   of	  	  	   34.	   MICHAEL	  LIPSKY,	  STREET-­‐LEVEL	  BUREAUCRACY:	  DILEMMAS	  OF	  THE	  INDIVIDUAL	  IN	  PUBLIC	  SERVICES	  3	  (1980)	  (emphasis	  omitted).	  	  	   35.	   Note	   the	   parallel	   here.	   As	   with	   exit	   and	   voice,	   agency	   takes	   two	   forms:	   one	   involves	  direct	   participation	   (serving	   on	   a	   jury	   or	   school	   board),	   and	   the	   other	   involves	   representation	  (voting	   for	   someone	   to	   administer	   federal	   law	   on	   one’s	   behalf).	   So,	   too,	   voice	   and	   exit	   involve	  direct	  participation	  (the	  right	  to	  speak	  or	  form	  a	  private	  association)	  and	  representation	  (voting	  under	  the	  diversity	  paradigm	  or	  under	  federalism).	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  decisionmakers	   implementing	   it	   at	   the	   periphery.	   These	  decisionmaking	   bodies	   are	   usually	   charged	   with	   implementing	   a	  legislative	  or	   executive	  mandate—a	   jury	  applying	   the	   law	  enacted	  by	  Congress,	   a	   school	   board	   implementing	   the	   policy	   set	   by	   the	  Department	   of	   Education.	   The	   chance	   to	   register	   disagreement	  through	  a	  decision—to	  “dissent	  by	  deciding”36—emerges	  ad	  hoc,	  either	  by	   the	   grace	   of	   the	   majority	   or	   out	   of	   practical	   necessity.	   Juries,	   for	  instance,	   can	   render	   a	   decision	   only	   within	   a	   range	   set	   by	   the	  legislature.	   State	   environmental	   agencies	   carry	   out	   duties	   that	   the	  federal	   government	   assigns	   to	   them.	   School	   boards	   implement	  policy	  within	  a	  range	  set	  by	  a	  central	  policymaker.	  Opportunities	  for	  agency	  do	  not,	  however,	  depend	  entirely	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	   the	  majority	   to	  cede	  some	  discretion	  to	   the	   lower-­‐level	  decisionmakers.	   Disaggregated	   institutions	   are	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  mass	  governance.	  Central	  decisionmakers	  must	  give	  some	  discretion	   to	   lower-­‐level	   decisionmakers	   to	   interpret	   and	   implement	  the	  majority’s	   decrees.	   Juries,	   school	   boards,	   city	   governments,	   state-­‐created	  bureaucracies—all	  serve	  as	  agents	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  And	   in	   the	  gap	  between	   the	  policy	   and	   its	   administration	  often	   lies	   a	  sizeable	   amount	   of	   discretion	   for	   those	   on	   the	   periphery,	   the	  opportunity	  to	  regulate	  as	  they	  see	  fit,	  to	  “edit”	  the	  policy	  that	  they	  lack	  the	  power	   to	   “authorize.”37	   In	   these	   innumerable	  nooks	  and	  crannies,	  there	   are	  many	   places	  where	   geographically	   concentrated	  minorities	  can	   exercise	   power.	   Residential	   segregation	   is	   something	   we	   often	  mourn	   in	   this	   country,	   and	  with	   good	   reason.	   But	   in	   a	   decentralized	  system	   like	   our	   own,	   these	   clusters	   also	   provide	   minorities	   with	   an	  avenue	  of	  influence.	  Cooperative	   federalism	   is	   thus	   paired	   with	   uncooperative	  federalism.38	  Cooperative	  localism	  is	  paired	  with	  local	  resistance.39	  The	  	  	   36.	   Gerken,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  1749.	  	  	   37.	   I	   borrow	   these	   terms	   from	   Philip	   Pettit.	   See	   Philip	   Pettit,	   Republican	   Freedom	   and	  
Contestatory	   Democratization,	   in	  DEMOCRACY’S	   VALUE	   163,	   164	   (Ian	   Shapiro	   &	   Casiano	   Hacker-­‐Cordón	  eds.,	  1999).	  Pettit,	  however,	  uses	  them	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  context,	  discussing	  the	  need	  to	   grant	   electoral	  minorities	   the	  opportunity	   to	   “edit”	   the	   law	  by	   contesting	   it	   in	   an	   acceptably	  neutral	  process—such	  as	  a	  proceeding	  before	  a	   judge,	  a	   jury,	  or	  an	  administrative	  agency—and	  thereby	  to	  vindicate	  what	  he	  terms	  a	  “contestatory”	  or	  “oppositional”	  model	  of	  democracy.	  Id.	  at	  183–85.	   His	   conception	   of	   dissent	   focuses	  more	   on	   elites	   and	   less	   on	   a	   populist	   conception	   in	  which	  the	  people	  speak	  for	  themselves.	  	  	   38.	   See	  Jessica	  Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken,	  Uncooperative	  Federalism,	  118	  YALE	  L.J.	  1256,	  1259	  (2009).	  	   39.	   See	  Nestor	  M.	  Davidson,	  Cooperative	   Localism:	   Federal-­‐Local	   Collaboration	   in	   an	   Era	   of	  
State	  Sovereignty,	  93	  VA.	  L.	  REV.	  959,	  960	  (2007).	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  who	  are	  nominally	  state	  and	   federal	  bureaucrats	   include	  state	  legislators	   and	   everyday	   citizens,	   decisionmakers	  who	   pair	   expertise	  with	  politics,	  and	  those	  whose	  jobs	  are	  all	  but	  entirely	  political.	  Even	  in	  highly	   centralized,	   highly	   technocratic	   federal	   bureaucracies,	   we	   see	  state	   and	   local	   variation	   in	   carrying	   out	   what	   otherwise	   seem	   like	  routinized	  policy	  jobs.40	  The	  rebellion	  of	  the	  street-­‐level	  bureaucrat	  is	  hardly	  confined	  to	  the	  street.	  In	   each	  of	   these	   examples,	   the	  decisionmakers	   in	   question	   serve	  two	   masters,	   not	   one.	   They	   are	   nominally	   the	   agents	   of	   the	   federal	  government.	   But	   they	   are	   differently	   composed	   and	   thus	   draw	   their	  power	   from	   a	   different	   power	   base	   than	   those	   at	   the	   center—a	  randomly	   drawn	   jury	   carrying	   out	   a	   congressional	   command,	   local	  school	   officials	   carrying	   out	   the	   president’s	   education	   policy,	   a	  bureaucracy	  created	  by	  a	  state	  whose	  political	   leadership	  is	  hostile	  to	  the	  federal	  mandate.	  One	   might	   argue	   that	   this	   sort	   of	   decisionmaking	   power	   isn’t	  really	  a	   form	  of	   influence	  because,	   in	  sharp	  contrast	   to	  voice	  and	  exit,	  agency	   involves	  minorities	   controlling	   rather	   than	  merely	   influencing	  decisions	  as	   to	  how	  national	  policy	  gets	   implemented.	  But	   remember	  that	  the	  decision	  over	  which	  they	  exercise	  control	  isn’t	  “the”	  decision.	  As	   I	   describe	   in	   greater	   detail	   below,	   minorities	   aren’t	   changing	  national	   policy;	   they	   are	   changing	   parts	   of	   it,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  influencing	   national	   policy	   in	   its	   entirety	   going	   forward.	   Indeed,	   at	  some	  level	  of	  generality,	  agency	  promotes	  minority	  influence	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  voice	  and	  exit	  do:	  it	  allows	  minorities	  to	  signal	  dissent	  and	   model	   an	   alternative	   approach.	   If	   parents	   can	   influence	  policymakers	  by	  exiting	   the	  public	  school	  system,	  bureaucrats	  can	  do	  the	  same	  by	  opting	  out	  of	  a	  federal	  program.	  If	  minorities	  can	  influence	  the	  national	  debate	  with	  an	  editorial,	  they	  can	  do	  the	  same	  by	  engaging	  in	  jury	  nullification	  or	  licensing	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  to	  marry.	  2.	   Beyond	   Voice	   and	   Exit.	   	   If	   you	   think	   that	   minorities’	  administrative	   roles	   offer	   them	   channels	   for	   influencing	   national	  policy,	   it’s	   not	   hard	   to	   imagine	   why	   minorities	   might	   find	   these	  channels	  valuable.	  Think	  about	   the	  options	   that	   are	  otherwise	  on	   the	  	  	   40.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Jerry	  L.	  Mashaw,	  Accountability	  and	   Institutional	  Design:	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  
Grammar	   of	   Governance,	   in	   PUBLIC	  ACCOUNTABILITY:	  DESIGNS,	  DILEMMAS	   AND	  EXPERIENCES	   115,	  142–44	   (Michael	   W.	   Dowdle	   ed.,	   2006);	   John	   T.	   Scholz,	   Jim	   Twombly	   &	   Barbara	   Headrick,	  
Street-­‐Level	   Political	   Controls	   over	   Federal	   Bureaucracy,	   85	   AM.	   POL.	   SCI.	   REV.	   829,	   831–32	  (1991);	  see	  also	  LIPSKY,	  supra	  note	  34,	  at	  13.	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  table.	   On	   the	   structural	   side,	   constitutional	   theory	   offers	   us	   a	   choice	  between	  voice	  and	  exit.	  When	  you	  are	  part	  of	  the	  national	  system,	  the	  diversity	  paradigm	  (roughly)	  governs.41	  The	  political	  power	  minorities	  wield	   is,	   at	   least	   in	   theory,	   roughly	  proportional	   to	   their	   share	  of	   the	  national	  vote.	  When	  we	  lay	  the	  diversity	  model	  down	  next	  to	  its	  main	  institutional	   competitor,	   federalism,	   one	   can	   immediately	   see	   what’s	  odd	   about	   this	   strategy	   for	   empowering	   minorities:	   diversity	  relentlessly	   reproduces	   in	   governance	   bodies	   the	   same	   inequalities	  that	   minorities	   experience	   pretty	   much	   everywhere	   else.	   On	   any	  politically	   salient	   issue	   on	  which	   the	  minority	   and	  majority	   routinely	  divide,	   minorities	   voting	   in	   national	   elections	   are	   destined	   to	   be	  political	  losers.	  You	  can	  see,	  then,	  the	  attractions	  of	  the	  exit	  option	  that	  federalism	  offers.	   Federalism	   gives	   minorities	   the	   chance	   to	   be	   the	   majority.	   It	  gives	  them	  more	  than	  influence	  at	  the	  local	  level;	  it	  gives	  them	  control.	  But	  note	  that	  this	  benefit	  comes	  with	  a	  price.	  Minorities	  must	  exit	  the	  national	   system—they	   must	   work	   at	   the	   state	   level—in	   order	   to	  exercise	   that	   power.	   Their	   power	   is	   protected,	   in	   fact,	   precisely	  because	  they	  are	  outsiders;	  sovereignty	  and	  autonomy	  are	  keyed	  to	  it.	  Indeed,	  sovereignty	  and	  autonomy	  arguably	  reify	  minorities’	  outsider	  status.	   The	   decisions	   that	   minorities	   render	   are	   protected	   precisely	  because	   they	   are	   the	   decisions	   of	   a	   state	   polity,	   not	   “the”	   national	  polity.	   Under	   federalism’s	   exit	   option,	   minorities	   get	   to	   wield	  governmental	  authority,	  but	  they	  don’t	  get	  to	  wield	  it	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  national	  government.	  Roughly	  the	  same	  set	  of	  trade-­‐offs	  obtains	  on	  the	  rights	  side	  of	  the	  equation.	   Minorities	   have	   the	   right	   to	   speak	   and	   to	   petition	   their	  government.	  When	  they	  do	  so,	  however,	  they	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  the	   decisionmaking	   process.	   That	   sort	   of	   power	   comes,	   if	   at	   all,	   only	  when	  minorities	  take	  an	  exit	  option	  and	  create	  a	  private	  association	  to	  govern	   themselves	   along	   the	   lines	   the	  majority	   has	   rejected.	   And	   the	  decisions	  of	   that	  association	  are	  protected	  precisely	  because	   they	  are	  private.	  If	  minorities	  begin	  to	  wield	  public	  authority,	  they	  also	  begin	  to	  lose	  the	  protections	  the	  First	  Amendment	  provides.42	  If	   one	  begins	   to	   compare	   the	   relative	   costs	   and	  benefits	   of	   voice	  and	   exit,	   one	   can	   see	   that	   there	   may	   be	   instances	   in	   which	   political	  	  	   41.	   I	   used	   the	   weasel	   word	   roughly	   because	   we	   elect	   congressional	   representatives	   from	  states	   and	   districts	   and	   the	   president	   via	   the	   electoral	   college,	   which	   ensures	   that	   particular	  minorities	  do	  better	  than	  their	  numbers	  would	  otherwise	  suggest.	  	   42.	   The	  canonical	  case	  is	  Rust	  v.	  Sullivan,	  500	  U.S.	  173	  (1991).	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  minorities	  might	  like	  to	  wield	  the	  power	  exit	  confers—control,	  not	  just	  voice—without	   having	   to	   exit	   to	   the	   state	   or	   to	   the	   private	   sphere.	  Minorities	   might	   sometimes	   prefer	   to	   help	   administer	   the	   federal	  empire	   than	   administer	   an	   empire	   of	   one’s	   own,	   to	   serve	   as	   a	  policymaking	  insider	  rather	  than	  an	  autonomous	  outsider,	  a	  critic	  from	  within	  rather	  than	  a	  dissenter	  from	  without.	  As	  with	  exit	  and	  voice,	  there	  is	  a	  price	  to	  influence	  that	  takes	  this	  form.	   Agency	   gives	   minorities	   the	   power	   to	   make	   decisions,	   but—in	  sharp	   contrast	   to	   the	   exit	   model—those	   decisions	   are	   not	   shielded	  from	   reversal.	   The	   center	   can—and	   sometimes	   does—overrule	   the	  periphery.	  All	   three	   channels	   of	   influence	   involve	   trade-­‐offs.	   Voice	   offers	  insider	   status	  without	  majority	   status.	   Exit	   does	   the	   reverse.	   Agency	  offers	  both	  majority	  and	   insider	  status,	  but	   the	  power	  that	  minorities	  wield	  is	  that	  of	  the	  servant	  rather	  than	  the	  sovereign,	  the	  agent	  rather	  than	   the	   principal.	   The	   decisions	   minorities	   make	   in	   an	   integrated	  policymaking	  regime	  are	  thus	  not	  protected	  from	  reversal.43	  For	  those	  who	  prefer	  a	  matrix,	  here’s	  a	  rough	  breakdown:	  	   	  
	  	   43.	   Certain	   types	   of	   jury	   verdicts,	   such	   as	   “not	   guilty”	   verdicts	   in	   criminal	   cases,	   are	   an	  exception.	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Table	  2.	  Mapping	  Exit,	  Voice,	  and	  Agency	  
	  	   	   Exit	   Voice	   Agency	  
Status	   Outsider Insider Insider 
Decisionmaking 
control/majority 
status	   Yes No Yes 
Protection from 
reversal	   Yes Yes No 	  One	  might,	   of	   course,	   think	   that	   the	   power	   of	   the	   servant	   isn’t	   a	  form	  of	  power	  at	  all.	  What	  good	  does	  it	  do	  to	  enact	  a	  policy	  if	  it	  is	  not	  shielded	  from	  reversal?	  I	  spend	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  in	  a	  recent	  paper	  arguing	  that	  the	  power	  of	  the	  servant	  is	  actually	  quite	  important.44	  Just	  ask	  any	  administrative-­‐law	  scholar,	  or	  indeed,	  anyone	  who	  has	  written	  on	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  agent	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	   the	   principal—agency	   is	   different	   from	   exit—but	   it	   is	   power	  nonetheless.	  I	   won’t	   offer	   a	   full	   survey	   here,45	   but	   let	   me	   sketch	   a	   couple	   of	  reasons	   why	   the	   power	   of	   the	   servant	   matters—why	   agency	   can	  sometimes	  offer	  minorities	   a	   robust	   channel	  of	   influence.	  One	   reason	  that	   servants	   are	  powerful	   is	   that	   the	   center	  depends	  on	   them	   to	   get	  anything	   done.	   Members	   of	   Congress	   and	   the	   president	   can’t	  personally	   ensure	   that	   every	   one	   of	   their	   policies	   is	   implemented	  perfectly.	  They	   can	  exercise	   their	  political	   capital	  here	  and	   there,	  but	  they	   have	   to	   pick	   and	   choose,	   and	   ultimately	   they	   are	   dependent	   on	  others	  to	  put	  their	  policies	  into	  place.	  That	  leaves	  room	  for	  minorities	  to	  push	  back	  against	  federal	  mandates.	  
	  	   44.	   See	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  33–44.	  	  	   45.	   For	  more	  developed	  arguments,	   see	   id.	   at	  33–44,	  68–71;	   and	  Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  
supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1265–71.	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  are	  also	  powerful	  precisely	  because	   they	  are	   integrated	  in	  the	  system	  rather	  than	  standing	  outside	  of	  it.	  State	  and	  local	  officials	  can	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   web	   of	   connective	   tissues	   that	   bind	   the	  periphery	  to	  the	  center.	  Moreover,	   insider	  status	  gives	  state	  and	  local	  officials	   standing—in	   the	   colloquial	   sense—to	   challenge	   the	   center.	  They	   can	   voice	   dissent	   from	  within	   the	   system,	   base	   their	   claims	   on	  shared	  expertise	  and	  experience,	  and	  cast	  that	  dissent	  in	  terms	  readily	  comprehensible	   to	   the	   relevant	   decisionmakers.	   They	   thus	   resemble	  Michael	  Walzer’s	  “connected	  critics.”46	  Walzer	   insists	   that	  an	  effective	  critic	  must	  be	  “[a]	  little	  to	  the	  side,	  but	  not	  outside”	  of	  the	  community	  she	  challenges,	  as	  her	  ability	   to	  dissent	  effectively	  will	  depend	  on	  her	  ties	  to	  the	  community.47	  So,	  too,	  minorities	  who	  exercise	  agency	  are	  a	  little	   to	   the	   side	   but	   not	   outside	   the	   system	   and	   thus	   capable	   of	  dissenting	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  true	  outsiders	  cannot.	  Finally,	   servants	  may	  be	  better	   able	   to	  provoke	   a	   response	   from	  the	  center	   than	   the	  prototypical	  dissenter,	  precisely	  because	   they	  are	  inside	   rather	   than	   outside	   the	   system.	   It’s	   often	   relatively	   easy	   to	  ignore	  a	  contrary	  policy	  when	  that	  policy	  is	  put	  in	  place	  elsewhere.	  It’s	  harder	   to	   ignore	  outliers	  when	   they	  are	   in	  your	  midst.	  California	  and	  the	  United	  States	  can	  ignore	  the	  Netherlands	  when	  it	  licenses	  same-­‐sex	  couples	   to	   marry,	   but	   they	   can’t	   do	   the	   same	   when	   the	   City	   of	   San	  Francisco	   does	   so.	  When	  minorities	   exercise	   agency,	   they	   thwart	   the	  uniform	   administration	   of	   federal	   law	   and	   create	   the	   risk	   that	   other	  federal	  “agents”	  will	  demand	  a	  similar	  exemption.	  It	  is	  also	  irritating	  to	  see	  one’s	  own	  monies	  hijacked	  to	  challenge	  the	  very	  policy	  those	  funds	  are	   supposed	   to	   promote.	   As	   Jessica	   Bulman-­‐Pozen	   and	   I	   observe	  elsewhere,	  “[m]odus	  vivendi	  is	  less	  palatable	  when	  funded	  out	  of	  your	  own	  pocket.”48	  III.	  WHY	  THE	  GAP	  IN	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  THEORY?	  THE	  COMPLEXITIES	  OF	  LOYALTY	  If	   one	   accepts	   the	   notion	   that	   agency	   represents	   a	   third	   path	   of	  minority	   influence,	   the	  natural	  question	   is	  why	   it’s	  been	  neglected	  by	  constitutional	   theorists.	   We	   have	   a	   field	   devoted	   to	   cooperative	  	  	   46.	   MICHAEL	  WALZER,	  INTERPRETATION	  AND	  SOCIAL	  CRITICISM	  39	  (1987).	  	   47.	   Id.	  at	  61.	  	   48.	   Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1287;	  cf.	  Ronald	  Reagan,	  Remarks	  at	  the	  New	  Hampshire	  Republican	  Primary	  Debates	  (Feb.	  23,	  1980)	  (“I	  am	  paying	  for	  this	  microphone	  .	  .	  .	  !”);	  
State	  of	   the	  Union	   (Liberty	  Films	  1948)	   (“Don’t	   you	   shut	  me	  off;	   I’m	  paying	   for	   this	  broadcast.”	  (quoting	  Spencer	  Tracy’s	  character)).	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  federalism	   but	  we	   neglect	   uncooperative	   federalism.	  We	   have	   a	   field	  devoted	  to	  thinking	  about	  dissent	  from	  without	  but	  we	  neglect	  dissent	  from	  within.49	  We	  think	  a	  great	  deal	  about	   the	  role	  minorities	  play	   in	  making	   national	   policy	   but	   not	   about	   the	   role	   they	   play	   in	  implementing	  national	  policy.50	  
A.	   Minding	  the	  Gap	  We	  don’t	  just	  neglect	  this	  avenue	  of	  influence;	  we	  disparage	  it.	  We	  call	   it	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   problem	   and	   treat	   it	   as	   a	   nuisance	   to	   be	  solved	  rather	  than	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  celebrated.	  We	  romanticize	  the	  solitary	  dissenter,	  but	  we	  have	  no	  celebratory	  term	  for	  what	  happens	  when	   local	   dissenters	   join	   together	   to	   put	   their	   policies	   in	   place.	  Instead,	   the	   only	   terms	  we	   have	   are	   negative.	  We	   term	   those	   places	  where	  dissenters	  dominate	  as	  “lawless”	  or	  “parochial.”51	  This	   isn’t	   just	  a	  nominalist	  claim;	   it’s	  a	  substantive	  one.	  Why	  is	   it	  that	   those	   who	   care	   about	   dissent	   have	   largely	   ignored	   minority-­‐dominated	   governance	   in	   thinking	   about	   the	   question	   of	   minority	  empowerment?	  Why	  do	  they	  stick	  with	  a	  rights-­‐based	  account	  of	  what	  a	   democracy	   owes	   to	   its	  minorities?	   Dissenters	   have	   long	   used	   local	  concentrations	   of	   power	   to	   build	   support	   for	   their	   positions.	   For	  example,	  much	   of	   the	  work	   on	   gay	   rights	   has	   been	   done	   at	   the	   local	  level.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  even	  given	  us	  a	  case	   to	   think	  about	   the	  issue.52	  To	   top	   it	  all	  off,	   theorists	  of	  dissent	  do	   think	  about	   the	  values	  associated	  with	  minority-­‐dominated	  institutions	  in	  the	  private	  sphere,	  where	   work	   on	   associational	   rights	   and	   pluralism	   places	   great	  emphasis	  on	  what	  a	  democracy	  owes	  its	  minorities.	  So	  why	  don’t	  these	  	  	   49.	   First	  Amendment	  scholars	  have	  thought	  about	  the	  rights	  of	  whistleblowers,	  of	  course,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rights	  of	  government	  employees.	  See	  generally,	  e.g.,	  Rosalie	  Berger	  Levinson,	  Silencing	  
Government	  Employee	  Whistleblowers	  in	  the	  Name	  of	  “Efficiency”,	  23	  OHIO	  N.U.	  L.	  REV.	  17	  (1996);	  Randy	   J.	  Kozel,	  Reconceptualizing	  Public	  Employee	  Speech,	  99	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  1007	  (2005);	  Gia	  B.	  Lee,	   First	   Amendment	   Enforcement	   in	   Government	   Institutions	   and	   Programs,	   56	   UCLA	   L.	   REV.	  1691,	  1766-­‐71	  (2009);	  Helen	  Norton,	  Constraining	  Public	  Employee	  Speech:	  Government’s	  Control	  
of	  Its	  Workers’	  Speech	  To	  Protect	  Its	  Own	  Expression,	  59	  DUKE	  L.J.	  1	  (2009);	  cf.	  supra	  note	  42.	  They	  are	  insiders	  in	  some	  senses,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  I	  describe	  here	  (individuals	  who	  are	  such	  deeply	  involved	  insiders	  that	  they	  control	  the	  levers	  of	  power).	  	   50.	   Administrative	  law	  scholars	  have	  done	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  work	  on	  this	  topic,	  although	  most	  focus	  on	  different	  issues	  than	  those	  discussed	  here.	  	   51.	   Nestor	   M.	   Davidson	   offers	   the	   term	   “lawless	   localities”	   in	   his	   efforts	   to	   critique	   it.	  Davidson,	   supra	   note	  39,	   at	   1017–26.	  For	  a	  similar	  critique	  challenging	  the	  “usual	  parochialism	  story”	  that	  depicts	  localities	  as	  hostile	  to	  religious	  minorities,	  see	  Richard	  C.	  Schragger,	  The	  Role	  
of	  the	  Local	  in	  the	  Doctrine	  and	  Discourse	  of	  Religious	  Liberty,	  117	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1810,	  1815	  (2004).	  	  	   52.	   Romer	  v.	  Evans,	  517	  U.S.	  620	  (1996).	  The	  case	  has	  been	  cast	  in	  these	  terms	  by	  scholars	  of	  local	  government	  law,	  but	  not	  by	  constitutional	  theorists.	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   minority-­‐dominated	   governance—“pluralism”	  within	   the	   public	   sphere—as	   yet	   another	   tool	   for	   minority	  empowerment?	  Or	   consider	   federalism,	   the	  one	   theory	   in	   constitutional	   law	   that	  depends	   on,	   even	   glories	   in,	   the	   notion	   that	   national	   minorities	  constitute	   local	  majorities.53	   Federalism,	   as	  noted	   above,	   is	   so	   closely	  tied	   to	   an	   exit	   account	   that	   it	   mostly	   neglects	   the	   administrative	  arrangements	  I	  describe	  here—those	  in	  which	  state	  and	  local	  officials	  implement	  federal	  law	  in	  an	  integrated	  policymaking	  regime.	  And	  even	  when	  scholars	  turn	  to	  these	  administrative	  arrangements,	  the	  term	  we	  use	  to	  describe	  them	  is	  cooperative	  federalism.	  Here	  again,	  this	  isn’t	  just	  a	  nominalist	  claim.	  There	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	   work	   on	   “cooperative”	   federalism—the	   institutional	   arrangements	  in	   which	   a	   complex	   amalgam	   of	   local,	   state,	   and	   federal	   officials	  regulate	   together.	   As	   the	   moniker	   suggests,	   however,	   the	   work	   on	  cooperative	   federalism	   dwells	   almost	   entirely	   on	   the	   happy	  dimensions	   of	   federal-­‐state	   regulation.	   Scholars	   of	   cooperative	  federalism	   emphasize	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   joint	   regulation	   promotes	  mutual	   learning,	   healthy	   competition,	   and	   useful	   redundancy.	   These	  scholars	   neglect	   the	   uncooperative	   dimensions	   of	   cooperative	  federalism	   and	   the	   democratic	   elements	   of	   these	   bureaucratic	  arrangements.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   work	   in	   federalism	   theory	   that	   does	  focus	  on	  political	  outliers	  and	  resistance—the	  role	  federalism	  plays	  in	  checking	   an	   overweening	   national	   government	   and	   promoting	  dissent—is	  almost	  entirely	  confined	  to	  conventional	  federalism	  theory,	  where	  exit	  is	  the	  dominant	  account.54	  Federalism	   scholarship	   doesn’t	   just	   neglect	   uncooperative	  federalism;	   it	   also	   neglects	   uncooperative	   localism.	   Federalism	  scholars,	  after	  all,	  are	  the	  rare	  academics	  who	  don’t	  always	  think	  that	  the	   principal-­‐agent	   problem	   is	   a	   problem.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   they	  celebrate	   the	   opportunities	   for	   rebellion	   and	   contestation	   that	  decentralization	   provides.	   And	   it’s	   just	   a	   hop,	   skip,	   and	   a	   jump	   from	  theorizing	   about	   states	   to	   theorizing	   about	   the	   local,	   substate,	   and	  	  	   53.	   Although	  election	  law	  focuses	  on	  minority-­‐majority	  districts,	  the	  main	  intellectual	  push	  behind	  them	  is	   that	   they	  are	  the	  best	  means	  for	  creating	  a	  statistically	   integrated	   legislature.	   In	  the	   words	   of	   Richard	   Pildes,	   “[t]he	   very	   theory	   of	   districted	   elections	   .	   .	   .	   is	   that	   democratic	  institutions	   are	   best	   designed	   by	   .	   .	   .	   fragmenting	  majoritarian	   domination.	   Districted	   elections	  empower	  local	  minorities	  who	  would	  otherwise	  be	  swallowed	  up	  in	  a	  system	  not	  self-­‐consciously	  designed	  to	  ensure	  some	  representation	  of	  their	  interests.”	  Richard	  H.	  Pildes,	  Diffusion	  of	  Political	  
Power	  and	  the	  Voting	  Rights	  Act,	  24	  HARV.	  J.L.	  &	  PUB.	  POL’Y	  119,	  124	  (2000).	  	  	   54.	   See	  supra	  notes	  11–22	  and	  accompanying	  text.	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  sublocal	  institutions	  where	  dissenters	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  such	  opportunities.	   As	   a	   result,	   federalism	   scholars	   miss	   many	   an	  opportunity	   for	   intellectual	   arbitrage—the	   chance	   to	   connect	   their	  work	   on	   minority-­‐dominated	   governance	   to	   work	   done	   by	   their	  colleagues	  on	  the	  rights	  side	  of	  constitutional	  theory.	  
B.	   Agency	  and	  Disloyalty	  Why,	   then,	   do	   scholars	   neglect	   this	   third	   avenue	   of	   minority	  influence?	  It’s	  presumably	  because	  the	  notion	  of	  agency	  would	  require	  us	   to	   celebrate	   chaos	   and	   dissensus	   within	   a	   bureaucratic	   system,	  something	   that	   sits	  uneasily	  with	  most	  of	  us.	  When	   the	   subject	   is	   the	  administrative	  state,	  Weber	  is	  foremost	  in	  our	  minds,	  not	  Tocqueville.	  When	   we	   talk	   about	   democracy,	   we	   routinely	   celebrate	   the	  idiosyncratic	   dissenter,	   the	   nobility	   of	   resistance,	   the	   glory	   in	   getting	  things	  wrong,	  and	  the	  wild	  patchwork	  of	  views	  that	  make	  up	  the	  polity.	  When	   thinking	   about	   administrative	   arrangements,	   we	   laud	  bureaucratic	   efficiency,	   worry	   about	   local	   incompetence,	   and	   have	   a	  strong	   impulse	   to	   quash	   local	   rebellion.	   What	   is	   celebrated	   in	   the	  democratic	  realm	  is	  condemned	  in	  the	  bureaucratic	  one.	  If	   one	  were	   to	  press	   the	  point,	   surely	  most	  would	  admit	   that	   it’s	  useful	   to	   have	   institutionalized	   channels	   for	   dissent	   within	   federal	  administrative	   agencies.55	   Nonetheless,	   the	   notion	   that	   local	   or	   state	  agents	   might	   hijack	   federal	   policy	   in	   pursuit	   of	   their	   own	   agendas	  smacks	  of	  disloyalty.	   It’s	  one	  thing	   for	  dissenters	  to	  speak	  against	   the	  center;	   it’s	  quite	  another	  for	  them	  to	  use	  power	  the	  center	  gave	  them	  to	  thwart	  its	  wishes.	  This	  conception	  of	  loyalty	  is	  more	  robust	  than	  the	  one	  offered	  by	  Hirschman,	   who	   mostly	   thought	   of	   loyalty	   as	   a	   vaguely	   irrational	  impulse	  to	  cling	  to	  what	  one	  knew.56	  It	   is	  rooted	  in	  a	  Weberian	  vision	  of	   bureaucracy,	   one	   that	   suggests	   (reasonably	   enough)	   that	   the	  principal	  has	  the	  right	  to	  command	  the	  agent	  he’s	  hired	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  bidding.	   It’s	   a	   notion	   that	   privileges	   hierarchy,	   uniformity,	   and	   clear	  lines	  of	  authority.	  
	  	   55.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Neal	   Kumar	   Katyal,	   Internal	   Separation	   of	   Powers:	   Checking	   Today’s	   Most	  
Dangerous	   Branch	   from	   Within,	   115	   YALE	   L.J.	   2314,	   2317	   (2006)	   (“A	   critical	   mechanism	   to	  promote	   internal	  separation	  of	  powers	   is	  bureaucracy	   .	   .	   .	   .	   [B]ureaucracy	  creates	  a	  civil	  service	  not	   beholden	   to	   any	   particular	   administration	   and	   a	   cadre	   of	   experts	   with	   a	   long-­‐term	  institutional	  worldview.”).	  	  	   56.	   HIRSCHMAN,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  38,	  81.	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  of	  loyalty	  exerts	  such	  a	  strong	  hold	  on	  us	  that	  we	  view	  internal	  resistance	  with	  suspicion	  even	  when	  it’s	  entirely	  lawful.	  After	  all,	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  the	  conduct	  I	  would	  term	  “agency”	  easily	  fits	  within	  legal	  bounds,	   and	  yet	  we	   still	   react	   to	   it	  with	  distaste.	   Sometimes	  we	  authorize	   administrative	   units	   to	   dissent.	   For	   instance,	   it’s	   lawful	   for	  juries	  to	  nullify.	  Similarly,	  we	  often	  grant	  states	  licenses	  to	  experiment.	  That’s	  what	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  did	  for	  states	  like	  Michigan	  and	  Wisconsin,	   whose	   governors	   then	   used	   federal	   dollars	   to	   create	  “welfare	   to	   work”	   systems	   with	   the	   explicit	   aim	   of	   overturning	   the	  existing	   regime.57	   In	   other	   instances,	   political	   outliers	   simply	   take	  advantage	  of	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  federal	  mandate	  and	  use	  that	  decisionmaking	  space	   to	   take	   federal	   policy	   in	   a	   direction	   the	   center	   does	   not	  anticipate.	  California,	   for	   instance,	  has	   taken	  advantage	  of	  gaps	   in	   the	  federal	   regulations	   to	   enact	   stronger	   environmental	   regulations	   than	  federal	   officials	   would	   prefer.58	   State	   officials	   less	   enamored	   of	  environmental	  regulation	  have	  done	  the	  same,	  taking	  federal	  policy	  in	  a	  deregulatory	  direction.59	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  intuitively	  equate	  agency	  with	  disloyalty	  despite	  its	  lawfulness	  may	  also	  reveal	  how	  deeply	  rooted	  exit	  and	  voice	  are	  in	  our	  vocabulary.	  We	  have	  a	  firm	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  “loyal	  opposition”	  is	  supposed	   to	   do—speak	   out	   (voice)	   or	   get	   out	   (exit).	   That’s	   why	  activities	  that	  don’t	  fit	  neatly	  within	  the	  exit/voice	  paradigm—like	  civil	  disobedience—can	  cause	  us	  to	  turn	  analytic	  cartwheels.	  
C.	   The	  Loyal	  Opposition	  and	  Partial	  Loyalty	  Concepts	   like	   the	   “loyal	   opposition”	   and	   civil	   disobedience	   can	  also	  help	  us	  sort	  out	  how	  to	  think	  about	  acts	  of	  agency.	  Let’s	  start	  with	  those	   forms	   of	   agency	   that	   are	   plainly	   legal.	   As	   noted	   above,	   many	  forms	   of	   agency	   can	   fairly	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   law-­‐loving	   dissenter.60	  Much	   as	   dissenting	   speech	   is	   licensed	   by	   the	   First	  Amendment,	  these	  forms	  of	  agency	  are	  either	  explicitly	  licensed	  by	  the	  majority	   or,	   at	   least,	   left	   open	   to	   minorities	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   their	  legally	   conferred	   discretion.	   In	   these	   instances,	   minorities	   can	   both	  challenge	   the	  majority	   and	   yet	   act	   on	   its	   behalf;	   they	   can	   contest	   the	  law	  at	  the	  same	  moment	  that	  they	  comply	  with	  it.	  
	  	   57.	   For	  a	  description,	  see	  Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1274–76.	  	   58.	   For	  more	  detail,	  see	  id.	  at	  1276–78.	  	   59.	   See	  id.	  at	  1277.	  	   60.	   Thanks	  to	  Jiewuh	  Song	  for	  suggesting	  the	  phrase.	  
GERKEN IN PRINTER PROOF[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/13  4:34 PM 
2013]	   EXIT,	  VOICE,	  AND	  DISLOYALTY	   1373	  Minorities	   who	   exercise	   agency,	   then,	   are	   acting	   much	   like	  members	   of	   the	   loyal	   opposition;	   they	   share	   the	   majority’s	   basic	  commitments	   but	   differ	   as	   to	   how	   those	   commitments	   ought	   to	   be	  carried	  out.	  And	  while	   they	  are,	   in	   fact,	  challenging	  the	  majority,	   they	  are	   also	   serving	   it	   by	   ensuring	   that	   the	   polity	   is	   thinking	   through	   its	  decisions	   and	   taking	   into	   account	   all	   the	   relevant	   concerns.	   That	   is	  precisely	   why	   we	   think	   the	   opposition	   is	   loyal;	   we	   understand	  contestation	   to	   serve	   an	   important	   role	   in	   promoting	   sensible	  decisions	   and	   in	   fostering	   a	   healthy	   democracy.	   Little	   wonder,	   then,	  that	  many	   theories	   in	   constitutional	   law	   are	   keyed	   to	   our	   need	   for	   a	  loyal	   opposition.	   The	   First	   Amendment	   creates	   room	   for	   the	   loyal	  opposition	   in	   the	  private	   sphere	  by	  protecting	   the	   right	   to	   speak	  and	  associate.	  Federalism	  and	  diversity	  make	  space	  for	  the	  loyal	  opposition	  in	   the	   legislative	   sphere.	   And	   agency	   makes	   space	   for	   the	   loyal	  opposition	  in	  the	  administrative	  sphere.	  The	   strongest	   forms	   of	   what	   I	   term	   “agency”	   do	   indeed	   involve	  genuine	  rebellion—a	  deliberate	  effort	  to	  thwart	  federal	  law,	  or	  at	  least	  implement	   it	   in	   a	   manner	   plainly	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   federal	  mandate.	  Consider,	   for	   instance,	   states’	  outright	   refusal	   to	   implement	  portions	  of	  the	  Patriot	  Act.61	  But	  even	  these	  strong	  forms	  of	  agency	  are	  too	   quickly	   dismissed	   as	   disloyalty.	   Actions	   that	   involve	   direct	  challenges	   to	   federal	  mandates	   can	  be	  undertaken	   in	   the	   spirit	  of	   the	  loyal	   opposition.	   In	   these	   instances,	   minorities	   share	   the	   same	   basic	  goal	   as	   national	   policymakers	   (good	   education	   policy,	   sensible	  environmental	  regulation)	  even	  as	  they	  differ	  as	  to	  how	  to	  achieve	  it.	  The	   literature	  on	  civil	  disobedience	  helps	  clarify	   the	  relationship	  between	   loyalty	   and	   resistance.	   Civil	   disobedience	   involves	   “the	  purposeful	   and	   public	   defiance	   of	   an	   established	   law	   or	   norm,	  undertaken	   with	   the	   intent	   of	   altering	   state	   policy.”62	   But	   civil	  disobedience	  is	  not	  purely	  oppositional,	  at	  least	  under	  most	  influential	  accounts.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   both	   an	   act	   of	   affiliation	   and	   of	  contestation.	   Martin	   Luther	   King	   described	   civil	   disobedience	   as	  	  	   61.	   Uniting	   and	   Strengthening	   America	   by	   Providing	   Appropriate	   Tools	   Required	   To	  Intercept	  and	  Obstruct	  Terrorism	  Act	  of	  2001,	  Pub.	  L.	  No.	  107-­‐56,	  115	  Stat.	  272	  (2001)	  (codified	  as	  amended	   in	  scattered	  sections	  of	   the	  U.S.C.).	  For	  a	   full	  analysis,	  see	  Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  
supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1278–80.	  	   62.	   David	  S.	  Meyer,	  Civil	  Disobedience,	   in	  ENCYCLOPEDIA	  OF	  DEMOCRATIC	  THOUGHT	  60,	  60	  (Paul	  Barry	   Clarke	   &	   Joe	   Foweraker	   eds.,	   2001);	   see	   also	   JOHN	   RAWLS,	   A	   THEORY	   OF	   JUSTICE	   363,	   365	  (1971)	  (defining	  civil	  disobedience	  within	  a	  “more	  or	  less	  just	  democratic	  state”	  as	  “a	  political	  act	  not	   only	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   addressed	   to	   the	   majority	   that	   holds	   political	   power,	   but	   also	  because	  it	  is	  an	  act	  guided	  and	  justified	  by	  political	  principles”).	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  “break[ing]	  an	  unjust	   law	   .	   .	   .	  openly,	   lovingly.”63	   In	   the	  words	  of	   John	  Rawls,	  “It	  expresses	  disobedience	  to	  law	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  fidelity	  to	  law	  .	  .	  .	  .	  The	  law	  is	  broken,	  but	  fidelity	  to	  law	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  public	  and	  nonviolent	  nature	  of	  the	  act,	  by	  the	  willingness	  to	  accept	  the	  legal	  consequences	  of	  one’s	   conduct.”64	  For	   this	   reason,	  Rawls	   termed	  civil	  disobedience	   “that	   form	   of	   dissent”	   that	   stands	   “at	   the	   boundary	   of	  fidelity	   to	   law.”65	   Similarly,	   consider	   Harry	   Kalven’s	   evocative	  description	  of	  two	  civil-­‐rights	  protests:	  	   	   These	   are	   structured	   ceremonials	   of	   protest;	   they	   are	   not	   riots.	  The	  demonstrators	  were	  not	  .	  .	  .	  trying	  to	  bring	  government	  to	  a	  halt;	  rather	  they	  were	  expressing	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  young	  Negro	  about	  his	  situation.	  What	  was	   symbolized	  was	   a	  deep	  grievance,	   a	  break	  with	  the	  society.	  They	  prayed,	  they	  pledged	  allegiance	  to	  the	  flag,	  they	  sang	  “God	  Bless	  America,”	  and—in	  [one	  instance]—they	  even	  stopped	  for	  a	  red	  traffic	  light.66	  Notice	   that	   the	   power	   of	   civil	   disobedience	   hinges	   on	   the	  dissenters’	  reaffirmation	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  community.	  These	  acts	   of	   affiliation	   during	   the	   moment	   of	   dissent	   help	   protesters,	   to	  borrow	   a	   phrase	   Kalven	   uses	   elsewhere,	   “trap	   democracy	   in	   its	   own	  decencies.”67	  Similarly,	  when	  minorities	  exercise	  agency—when	  they	  use	   their	  power	   as	   national	   agents	   to	   challenge	   the	   policy	   they	   are	  	  	   63.	   MARTIN	  LUTHER	  KING,	   JR.,	  Letter	   from	  Birmingham	  City	   Jail,	   in	  A	  TESTAMENT	  OF	  HOPE:	  THE	  ESSENTIAL	  WRITINGS	  AND	  SPEECHES	  OF	  MARTIN	  LUTHER	  KING,	   JR.	  289,	  294	  (James	  M.	  Washington	  ed.,	  1986).	  	   64.	   RAWLS,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  366;	  see	  also	  KING,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  294	  (“[A]n	  individual	  who	  breaks	  a	  law	  that	  conscience	  tells	  him	  is	  unjust,	  and	  willingly	  accepts	  the	  penalty	  by	  staying	  in	  jail	  to	   arouse	   the	   conscience	   of	   the	   community	   over	   its	   injustice,	   is	   in	   reality	   expressing	   the	   very	  highest	   respect	   for	   law.”).	   Indeed,	   even	   conventional	   dissent	   is	   not	   always	   purely	   oppositional.	  Dissenters	   often	   affirm	   their	   loyalty	   to	   the	   polity	   while	   declaring	   their	   disagreement.	   See	  
generally,	   e.g.,	   Robert	  N.	   Strassfeld,	  Lose	   in	   Vietnam,	   Bring	   the	   Boys	  Home,	   82	  N.C.	   L.	   REV.	   1891	  (2004)	  (documenting	  the	  strategy	  of	  Vietnam	  protesters	  to	  counter	  their	  opponents’	  equation	  of	  dissent	  and	  disloyalty).	  Steven	  Shiffrin	  even	  goes	  so	   far	  as	   to	  argue	  that	  dissent	   functions	   like	  a	  “cultural	   glue	   that	   binds	   [dissenters]	   to	   the	   political	   community.”	   STEVEN	   H.	   SHIFFRIN,	   DISSENT,	  INJUSTICE,	  AND	  THE	  MEANINGS	  OF	  AMERICA	  18	  (1999).	  	   65.	   RAWLS,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  367.	  	   66.	   Harry	  Kalven,	  Jr.,	  The	  Concept	  of	  the	  Public	  Forum:	  Cox	  v.	  Louisiana,	  1965	  SUP.	  CT.	  REV.	  1,	  6.	  	  	   67.	   HARRY	  KALVEN,	   JR.,	   THE	  NEGRO	   AND	   THE	   FIRST	  AMENDMENT	   67	   (1965).	   The	   lessons	  Kalven	  draws	   from	   civil-­‐rights	   protests	   have	   apparently	   not	   been	   lost	   on	   the	  mayor	   of	   San	   Francisco,	  whose	   staff	   “made	   sure	   that	   when	   the	  mayor	   came	   out	   swinging	   against	   Bush’s	   backing	   for	   a	  constitutional	  amendment	  banning	  same-­‐sex	  marriage,	  he	  was	  standing	  in	  front	  of	  an	  American	  flag.”	  Phillip	  Matier	  &	  Andrew	  Ross,	  Newsom	  Hasn’t	  Been	  Ad-­‐Libbing,	  S.F.	  CHRON.,	  Feb.	  29,	  2004,	  at	  A19.	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  implementing—they	  look	  a	  good	  deal	  like	  civil	  disobedients.	  By	  virtue	  of	   their	   membership	   in	   the	   national	   governance	   structure,	   their	  challenges	   are	   understood	   as	   public	   and	   authoritative,	   not	   particular	  and	  private.	  The	  decisions	  minorities	  render	  are	  decisions	  of	  the	  polity,	  blessed	   as	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   national	   government	   even	   as	   they	  depart	   from	   the	   national	  majority’s	   preferences.	   And	   these	   decisions	  ensure	   that	   national	   policymaking	   reflects	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   the	  national	  polity.	  If	  we	  think	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  as	  an	  activity	  designed	  to	   signal	   partial	   disagreement,	   agency	   offers	   an	   institutional	   channel	  for	  achieving	  the	  same	  end.	  On	   this	   view,	   agency	   fits	   nicely	  with	  Walzer’s	   conception	  of	   civil	  disobedience,	   which	   he	   argues	   involves	   “partial	   loyalty”	   rather	   than	  disloyalty.	   Walzer	   argues	   that	   civil	   disobedience	   stems	   from	   the	  problem	   of	   overlapping	   membership:	   “When	   obligations	   incurred	   in	  some	   small	   group	   come	   into	   conflict	   with	   obligations	   incurred	   in	   a	  larger,	  more	   inclusive	  group,	  generally	   the	  state.”68	  Someone	  engaged	  in	  civil	  disobedience,	  Walzer	  believes,	  has	  only	  “partial	  claims”	  against	  the	  state;69	  his	  “loyalties	  are	  divided,”	  as	  “he	  is	  not	  in	  any	  simple	  sense	  a	  citizen”	  or	  a	  rebel	  but	  is	  instead	  partially	  both,	  precisely	  because	  “the	  processes	   through	   which	   men	   incur	   obligations	   are	   unavoidably	  pluralistic.”70	  Civil	  disobedients	  are	  thus	  “partial	  members[,]	  .	  .	  .	  partial	  emigrants,	  partial	   aliens,	  partial	   rebels.”71	  Others	  have	  written	   in	   this	  vein.	  Hannah	  Arendt,	   for	   instance,	   termed	   civil	   disobedients	   “nothing	  but	   the	   latest	   form	   of	   voluntary	   association.”72	   Similarly,	   Stephen	  Carter	  has	  argued	  that	  communities	  of	  faith	  are	  “separate	  sovereigns,”	  dissenting	   communities	  embedded	  within	   the	  polity	  and	  yet	  not	   fully	  part	  of	  it.73	  Dissent	  that	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  agency	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  instantiation	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  pluralism,	  at	  least	  on	  Walzer’s	  view.	  As	  with	  Walzer’s	  account	  of	  civil	  disobedience,	  this	  form	  of	  dissent	  allows	  citizens	  to	  engage	  in	  partial	  rebellion	  and	  thus	  “builds	  loyalty	  not	  only	  
	  	   68.	   Michael	  Walzer,	  The	  Obligation	  to	  Disobey,	  77	  ETHICS	  163,	  167	  (1967).	  	   69.	   Id.	  	   70.	   Id.	  at	  169–70.	  	   71.	   Id.	  at	  170.	  	   72.	   HANNAH	  ARENDT,	  Civil	  Disobedience,	  in	  CRISES	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLIC	  49,	  96	  (1972);	  see	  also	  id.	  at	  75–76.	  	   73.	   STEPHEN	   L.	   CARTER,	   THE	   DISSENT	   OF	   THE	   GOVERNED:	   A	   MEDITATION	   ON	   LAW,	   RELIGION,	   AND	  LOYALTY	  78	  (1998);	  see	  also	  id.	  at	  27–31.	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  toward	   the	   state	   but	   also	   against	   it.”74	   Agency	   does	   not	   demand	   an	  external	   emigration	   to	   accompany	   what	   Walzer	   terms	   the	   “internal	  emigration”	  of	  a	  dissenter.75	   Instead,	  minorities	  engaged	   in	  rebellious	  state	   or	   local	   policymaking	   are	   embedded	   insiders,	   not	   autonomous	  outsiders.	   They	   wield	   the	   power	   of	   the	   majority	   against	   itself.	   A	  minority	   can	   speak	   for	   the	   nation,	   just	   like	   any	   other	   citizen.	   To	   be	  sure,	   those	   engaged	   in	   dissent	   often	   affirm	   their	   membership	   in	   the	  polity.	   But	   here	   the	   polity,	   in	   effect,	   returns	   the	   favor	   by	   blessing—if	  only	  temporarily—the	  decision	  as	  its	  own.	  Notions	   like	   partial	   loyalty	   and	   the	   loyal	   opposition	   might	   also	  help	  us	  sort	  agency	   from	  genuine	  disloyalty.	  The	   loyal	  opposition,	   for	  instance,	  understands	  the	  lesson	  of	  dualism.76	  There	  are	  decisions,	  and	  then	   there	   are	   decisions.	   Although	   the	   loyal	   opposition	   can	   properly	  challenge	   decisions	   that	   have	   not	   yet	   been	   fully	   aired	   or	   vetted,	   we	  expect	  it	  to	  withdraw	  when	  the	  issue	  has	  been	  properly	  teed	  up	  and	  a	  national	   consensus	   has	   been	   reached.	   The	   loyal	   opposition,	   similarly,	  should	   take	   into	   account	   the	   costs	   of	   resistance.	  We	   expect	   it	   to	   act	  differently	   during	   times	   of	   emergency,	   for	   instance.	   Even	   during	  periods	  of	  normal	  politics,	  we	  expect	   the	   loyal	   opposition	   to	   exercise	  judgment;	   its	   job	   isn’t	   to	   challenge	   everything	  merely	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  doing	   so.	   Similarly,	   just	   as	  we	   expect	   civil	   disobedients	   to	   accept	   the	  punishment	  for	  their	   law	  breaking,	  so	  too	  we	  might	  expect	  dissenters	  who	  exercise	  agency	  to	  accept	  the	  center’s	  rebuke	  and	  step	  down	  when	  the	  center	  plays	   its	   trump	  card.	  Think,	   for	   instance,	  of	   the	  City	  of	  San	  Francisco,	   which	   stopped	   issuing	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   licenses	   the	  moment	  a	  court	  issued	  the	  appropriate	  order.77	  IV.	  IS	  AGENCY	  WORTH	  CELEBRATING?	  Imagining	   agency	   as	   a	   path	   of	   influence	   would	   require	   us	   to	  celebrate	  rather	  than	  mourn	  the	  fact	  that	  Tocqueville’s	  democracy	  fails	  to	  produce	  Weber’s	  bureaucracy.	  In	  our	  mostly	  decentralized,	  partially	  politicized	  bureaucracy,	  minorities	  can	  contest	  state	  and	  federal	  policy	  from	  within	  rather	  than	  criticize	  it	  from	  without.	  Everyday	  citizens	  and	  political	   elites	   serve	   as	   nominal	   bureaucrats	   for	   the	   federal	  	  	   74.	   MICHAEL	  WALZER,	  The	  Problem	  of	  Citizenship,	  in	  OBLIGATIONS:	  ESSAYS	  ON	  DISOBEDIENCE,	  WAR,	  AND	  CITIZENSHIP	  203,	  220	  (1970).	  	   75.	   Walzer,	  supra	  note	  68,	  at	  14.	  	   76.	   See,	  e.g.,	  1	  BRUCE	  ACKERMAN,	  WE	  THE	  PEOPLE:	  FOUNDATIONS	  (1991).	  	   77.	   Lockyer	   v.	   City	   of	   San	   Francisco,	   95	   P.3d	   459,	   467	   (Cal.	   2004);	   Dean	   E.	   Murphy,	   San	  
Francisco	  Forced	  To	  Halt	  Gay	  Marriages,	  S.F.	  CHRON.,	  Mar.	  12,	  2004,	  at	  A1.	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  government.	  The	  center’s	  agents	  can	  exercise	  agency	   in	   their	  ongoing	  debate	  with	  the	  center.	  One	  obvious	  reason	  for	  neglecting	  this	  topic	  is	  that	  it’s	  simply	  not	  worth	   celebrating.	   Can	   anything	   be	   said	   in	   favor	   of	   Tocquevillian	  administration?	  Such	  a	  system	  plainly	  has	  costs,	  so	  familiar	  to	  all	  of	  us	  that	   we	   have	   a	   name	   for	   them	   (principal-­‐agent	   problems).	   The	  question	  is	  whether	  these	  costs	  are	  so	  weighty	  that	  we	  should	  confine	  the	   “loyal	   opposition”	   to	   voice	   and	   exit	   and	   cut	   off	   opportunities	   for	  minorities	  to	  exercise	  agency	  (assuming	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  do	  so).	  Here	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  make	  the	  witless	  claim.	  I	  won’t	  argue	  that	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  is	  never	  a	  problem	  or	  suggest	  that	  we	  should	  ignore	   the	   many	   conventional	   arguments	   that	   favor	   Weber	   over	  Tocqueville.	   But	  we	   know	   those	   arguments,	   and	  we	   don’t	   have	   a	   full	  account	  of	   the	  alternative.	  My	  goal	   is	   to	   illuminate	  a	  set	  of	  arguments	  that	  are	  too	  often	  excluded	  from	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculus,	  not	  to	  do	  the	  math	  for	  you	  in	  advance.	  I	  will	  talk	  about	  some	  of	  those	  costs	  here,	  but	  only	  those	  that	  emerge	  when	  you	  think	  about	  minority	  influence	  in	  the	  terms	   I	   propose.	   I	   thus	   won’t	   canvass	   the	   litany	   of	   grievances	   we	  conventionally	  associate	  with	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  While	   much	   of	   my	   work	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   benefits	   generally	  associated	  with	  minority-­‐dominated	  governance,	  here	   I	  want	   to	   focus	  on	  what	  makes	  agency	  distinctive	  as	  an	  avenue	  of	  minority	  influence—what	  differentiates	  it	  from	  voice	  and	  exit.	  The	  arguments	  pivot	  off	  the	  features	   I’ve	   already	   identified	   in	   explaining	   why	   minorities	  themselves	   might	   value	   agency:	   it	   gives	   them	   the	   opportunity	   to	  exercise	  control	  rather	  than	  voice	  and	  to	  do	  so	  inside	  the	  system	  rather	  than	   outside	   of	   it.	   That’s	   all	   well	   and	   good	   for	   self-­‐interested	  minorities,	  of	  course,	  but	  what	  about	  the	  polity?	  Are	  there	  benefits	   to	  having	   a	   channel	   of	   influence	   that	   gives	   minorities	   control	   without	  forcing	   them	   to	   exit—a	   channel	   that	   grants	   both	  majority	   status	   and	  insider	  status	  in	  the	  decisionmaking	  process?	  One	   crude	  way	   to	   break	  down	   the	  work	   in	   constitutional	   theory	  involving	  voice	  and	  exit	  is	  to	  notice	  that	  it	  is	  largely	  preoccupied	  with	  two	   projects.	   The	   first	   is	   dialogue—ensuring	   a	   healthy	   amount	   of	  debate	   and	   disagreement	   within	   our	   democracy.	   The	   second	   is	  integration—ensuring	   that	   our	   fractious	   polity	   remains	   a	   polity.	   Exit,	  voice,	   and	   agency	   all	   further	   these	   goals,	   but	   they	   do	   so	   in	   quite	  different	  ways.	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A.	   Dialogue	  If	  we	  turn	  to	  one	  of	  the	  other	  main	  projects	  undergirding	  much	  of	  the	   work	   on	   constitutional	   theory—promoting	   healthy	   levels	   of	  dialogue	   and	   dissent—agency	   similarly	   offers	   some	   advantages	   over	  its	  institutional	  competitors.	  Think	   about	   the	   rights	   side	   of	   the	   equation.	   We	   value	   the	   First	  Amendment	  because	  it	  offers	  dissenters	  voice	  (or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  an	  exit	  option—that	   is,	   the	   exit	   option	   afforded	   by	   private	   speech	   or	  association).	  If	  we	  thought	  of	  agency	  as	  a	  third	  avenue	  for	  influence,	  we	  might	  imagine	  it	  serving	  as	  a	  competing	  or	  complementary	  channel	  for	  dissent.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  federalism,	  which	  has	  long	  been	  thought	  to	  serve	  the	  same	  type	  of	  dialogic	  values	  as	  the	  First	  Amendment.	  Indeed,	  if	   we	   accept	   one	   of	   federalism’s	   core	   insights—that	   it	   is	   useful	   for	  governing	   institutions	   to	   serve	   as	   challengers	   to	   the	   national	  government78—we	   might	   think	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   introduce	   sources	   of	  contestation	   and	   dissent	   within	   the	   behemoth	   we	   call	   the	   Fourth	  Branch.	  When	   states	   and	   localities	   are	   part	   of	   a	   federal	   administrative	  scheme,	   nominally	   bureaucratic	   roles	   are	   carried	   out	   by	   politicians,	  bureaucrats,	   and	   those	   who	   merge	   political	   savvy	   with	   technical	  expertise.	  This	   type	  of	  arrangement	  embeds	  would-­‐be	  dissenters	   into	  the	   federal	  regime.	   It	   thus	   introduces	  the	  dynamics	  of	   federalism	  into	  the	  Fourth	  Branch,	  ensuring	  that	  federalism	  serves	  as	  a	  safeguard	  for	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  administrative	  system.79	  	  	   78.	   Consider	  the	  extant	  work,	  beginning	  with	  Ernest	  Young’s	  argument	  analogizing	  states	  to	  the	  “shadow	  governments”	  found	  in	  European	  systems.	  Ernest	  A.	  Young,	  Welcome	  to	  the	  Dark	  
Side:	   Liberals	   Rediscover	   Federalism	   in	   the	  Wake	   of	   the	  War	   on	  Terror,	   69	  BROOK.	   L.	   REV.	   1277,	  1286–87	  (2004);	  see	  also	  Merritt,	  supra	  note	  20,	  at	  7.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  that	  states	  play	  in	  monitoring	  federal	  officials	  and	  training	  the	  loyal	  opposition,	  see	  Akhil	  Reed	  Amar,	  Some	  New	  
World	  Lessons	  for	  the	  Old	  World,	  58	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  483,	  499–505	  (1991);	  see	  also	  Baker	  &	  Young,	  
supra	   note	   21,	   at	   137–38.	   Andrzej	   Rapaczynski	   depicts	   local	   power	   as	   a	   “counterbalance”	   to	  federal	  lockup.	  Rapaczynski,	  supra	  note	  17,	  at	  386.	  Vicki	  Jackson	  observes	  that	  the	  usefulness	  of	  “direct[ing]	  political	  activism	  and	  organizing”	  to	  states	  is	  precisely	  because	  their	  borders	  do	  not	  map	  on	  to	  divisive	  political	  identities.	  Vicki	  C.	  Jackson,	  Federalism	  and	  the	  Uses	  and	  Limits	  of	  Law:	  Printz	   and	   Principle?,	   111	   HARV.	   L.	   REV.	   2180,	   2221–23	   (1998).	   Steven	   Calabresi	   asserts	   that	  “federalism	   sometimes	   can	  make	  minority	   groups	   feel	   secure	   while	   deemphasizing	   the	   lines	   of	  political	   and	   social	   cleavage.”	   Calabresi,	   supra	   note	   21,	   at	   763–64.	   Judith	   Resnik	   discusses	  localism’s	   role	   in	   promoting	   international	   rights	   and	   transnational	   cooperation.	   Judith	   Resnik,	  
Law’s	   Migration:	   American	   Exceptionalism,	   Silent	   Dialogues,	   and	   Federalism’s	   Multiple	   Ports	   of	  
Entry,	   115	   YALE.	   L.J.	   1564	   (2006).	   Daryl	   Levinson	   describes	   the	   role	   political	   parties	   play	   in	  diffusing	   power	   vertically.	   See	   generally	   Daryl	   J.	   Levinson,	   Empire-­‐Building	   Government	   in	  
Constitutional	  Law,	  118	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  915,	  938–44	  (2005).	  	  	   79.	   See	  Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1286.	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  Agency	   also	   allows	   minorities	   to	   pursue	   their	   goals	   through	  administrative	  channels	  as	  well	  as	  political	  ones.	  Minorities	  thus	  have	  an	   additional	   set	   of	   leverage	   points	   in	   pursuing	   their	   agenda.	   Better	  yet,	  agency	  gives	  them	  the	  opportunity	  to	  offer	  a	  real-­‐life	  instantiation	  of	   their	   views	   rather	   than	   an	   abstract	   argument	   in	   support	   of	   their	  claims.	  They	  need	  not	  merely	  claim	  that	  something	  can	  be	  done;	   they	  can	  show	  it	  can	  be	  done	  within	  the	  existing	  federal	  regime.	  Finally,	  as	  noted	   above,	   agency	  may	   be	   uniquely	  well	   suited	   for	   agenda	   setting.	  Precisely	  because	  it	  involves	  decisions	  made	  inside	  the	  system,	  it	  may	  be	  more	   likely	   to	   elicit	   a	   reaction	   from	   the	   center	   than	  will	   voice	   or	  exit.	  One	  might	  respond	  that	  it	  is	  absolutely	  essential	  for	  challenges	  to	  the	   federal	   government	   to	   be	   protected	   by	   something—state	  sovereignty	   or	   a	   robust	   form	  of	   autonomy	   at	   the	   governance	   level;	   a	  constitutional	  right	  at	  the	  individual	  or	  group	  level.	  After	  all,	  if	  you	  are	  challenging	   the	  center,	  what	  good	  does	   it	  do	   to	  enact	  a	  policy	  only	   to	  have	   it	   reversed?	  Exit	   offers	  protection	   against	   reversal;	   agency	  does	  not.	   It	   is	   certainly	   right	   to	   think	   that	   in	   some	   cases,	   agency	   won’t	  amount	   to	   much	   as	   a	   channel	   of	   dissent.	   Some	   challenges	   will	   get	  squashed	  and	  squashed	  quickly.	  There	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  dialogue	  between	  the	  center	  and	  the	  periphery	  will	  be	  one-­‐sided,	  with	  the	  center’s	  only	  response	  a	  resounding	  “no.”	  For	  dissenters,	  agenda-­‐setting	  power	  is	  as	  volatile	  as	  it	  is	  valuable.	  Issues	  can	  get	  put	  on	  the	  national	  agenda	  too	  quickly.	   Minorities’	   decisions	   may	   thus	   produce	   backlash—not	   just	  political	  backlash,	  which	  can	  be	  elicited	  by	  other	  forms	  of	  dissent,	  but	  backlash	   that	   takes	   a	   legal	   and	   thus	   more	   permanent	   form	   as	   the	  center	  takes	  the	  steps	  necessary	  to	  reverse	  the	  periphery’s	  decision.	  There	   is	   a	   risk,	   however,	   that	   we	   overestimate	   these	   costs	   in	  thinking	  about	  dissent.	  That’s	  because	  we	  ignore	  the	  trade-­‐off	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  agency	  illuminates:	  protection	  from	  reversal	  also	  means	  one	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  it	  might	  sometimes	  be	  just	  as	  useful	  to	  be	  making	  policy	  inside	  the	  system	  even	  if	  one	  risks	  reversal.	  This	   is	  a	  bit	  abstract,	  so	   let	  me	  ground	  it	  with	  an	  example.	  Think	  about	   the	   difference	   between	   two	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   decisions	   that	  occurred	   at	   roughly	   the	   same	   time:	   one	   in	   San	   Francisco,80	   the	   other	  in	   Massachusetts.81	   Massachusetts’s	   decision	   fell	   squarely	   within	  the	   conventional	   federalism	   account—an	   exit	   option.	   Its	  	  	   80.	   Lockyer,	  95	  P.3d	  459.	  	  	   81.	   Goodridge	  v.	  Dep’t	  of	  Pub.	  Health,	  798	  N.E.2d	  941	  (Mass.	  2003).	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   was	   protected	   by	   sovereignty	   and	   thus	   shielded	   from	  reversal	  by	  the	  national	  majority.	  When	  San	  Francisco	  began	  licensing	  same-­‐sex	   couples,	   in	   contrast,	   it	   could	  make	   no	   claim	   of	   sovereignty.	  Its	  decision	  could	  be	  reversed,	  and	  it	  was.82	  Surely	   most	   people	   think	   that	   Massachusetts	   made	   the	   decision	  that	   really	   mattered	   for	   getting	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   on	   the	   national	  agenda.	  Sovereignty	  protected	   that	  decision	   from	  reversal,	   something	  that	   gave	   the	   state	   the	   power	   to	   continue	   with	   the	   experiment,	   to	  provide	  a	  real-­‐life	   instantiation	  of	   its	  views	  that	  still	   stands	   today.	  No	  doubt	   this	   fact	   was	   important	   in	   shaping	   the	   ongoing	   debate.	   But	  notice	  that	  while	  Massachusetts’s	  decision	  was	  initially	  condemned,	   it	  dropped	   out	   of	   the	   ongoing	   national	   discussion	   until	   recently.	   Had	  Massachusetts	   been	   fully	   separate	   from	   the	   United	   States—had	   it	  been	   France	   or	   the	  Netherlands—one	  wonders	  whether	   the	   decision	  would	  have	  elicited	  any	  response	  in	  this	  country.	  San	   Francisco,	   in	   contrast,	   made	   the	   most	   of	   its	   status	   as	   an	  agent.	   Consistent	   with	   a	   sovereignty	   approach,	   Massachusetts’s	  leadership	   tried	   to	   confine	   the	   effects	   of	   its	   decision	   to	   its	   own	  territory	   by	   limiting	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   licenses	   to	   state	   residents.83	  San	   Francisco’s	   leaders,	   however,	   leveraged	   the	   city’s	   status	   as	   one	  actor	   embedded	   in	   a	   larger	   system	   by	   issuing	   marriage	   licenses	   to	  anyone	   willing	   to	   make	   the	   trip	   to	   California.	   This	   choice	   forced	  political	   actors	   in	   the	   states	   and	   the	   federal	   government—many	   of	  whom	  had	   previously	   ducked	   the	   issue—to	   take	   a	   stand	   on	  whether	  those	   marriages	   were	   valid.	   San	   Francisco,	   in	   other	   words,	   took	  advantage	  of	   its	  status	  as	  one	  part	  of	  a	   larger	  policymaking	  regime	  to	  wield	   one	   of	   the	  most	   powerful	   tools	   that	   a	   dissenter	   can	   have—the	  power	  to	  set	  the	  agenda.	  To	   get	   some	   sense	   of	   why	   agenda	   setting	   matters	   so	   much	   to	  dissenters,	   think	  about	  the	  First	  Amendment.	  Our	   iconic	   image	   is	  of	  a	  person	  standing	  on	  a	  soapbox.	  Now	  think	  about	  what	  you	  do	  when	  you	  see	  someone	  on	  that	  soapbox.	  You	  walk	  on	  by.	  That	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  trivial	   point.	   But	   often	   the	   majority’s	   best	   strategy	   in	   dealing	   with	  dissent	   will	   be	   radio	   silence,	   ignoring	   the	   challenge	   rather	   than	  engaging	   with	   it.	   That	   option	   simply	   became	   unavailable	   when	   San	  	  	   82.	   See	  supra	  note	  77	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	   83.	   Pam	  Belluck,	  Romney	  Won’t	  Let	  Gay	  Outsiders	  Wed	  in	  Massachusetts,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  25,	  2004,	   at	   N1.	   The	   state	   ultimately	   abandoned	   this	   policy	   and	   ended	   up	   marrying	   same-­‐sex	  couples	   from	  out	  of	  state.	  Katie	  Zezima,	  Massachusetts:	  Same-­‐Sex	  Couples	   from	  Other	  States	  May	  
now	  Marry,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Aug.	  1,	  2008,	  at	  A13.	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  Francisco	   took	   advantage	   of	   its	   status	   as	   an	   agent	   in	   a	   larger	  administrative	   structure	   and	   began	  marrying	   people	   from	   across	   the	  country.	  Because	  San	  Francisco	  was	  a	  servant	  rather	   than	  a	  sovereign,	  an	  agent	  rather	  than	  a	  principal,	  it	  could	  be	  reversed	  .	  .	  .	  and	  reversed	  and	  reversed	   and	   reversed.	   But,	   here	   again,	   one	   wonders	   whether	   San	  Francisco	   had	   more	   of	   an	   effect	   on	   this	   debate	   precisely	   because	   it	  repeatedly	   forced	   the	  majority	   to	   engage.	  Attempts	   to	   shut	  down	   the	  city’s	   efforts	   prompted	   two	   high-­‐profile,	   state-­‐court	   battles,	   backlash	  in	   the	   form	   of	   an	   initiative,	   and	   backlash	   to	   the	   backlash	   initiative.	  The	   city	   is	   now	   engaged	   in	   a	   third,	   high-­‐profile	   court	   case	   that	   is	  before	  the	   Supreme	   Court	  at	   the	  time	  of	   this	  writing.84	   And	   note	   that	  Massachusetts	   has	   recently	   reemerged	   in	   this	   debate	   only	   because	   a	  judge	   held	   that	   the	   federal	   government	   could	   not	   deny	   marriage	  benefits	   to	   same-­‐sex	   couples	   married	   within	   the	   state,85	   thus	  leveraging	  Massachusetts’s	   status	  as	   an	   integrated	  part	  of	   the	   federal	  regime	   in	   order	   to	   force	   the	   national	   government	   to	   engage.	   Should	  this	  effort	  be	  short-­‐circuited	  by	  an	  adverse	  ruling,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  whether,	  in	  the	  end,	  Massachusetts	  will	  look	  like	  the	  solitary	  dissenter	  on	   the	   soap	   box,	   precisely	   because	   it	   stands	   outside	   the	   system	   and	  cannot	  be	  reversed,	  whereas	  San	  Francisco,	  playing	  the	  servant’s	  role,	  will	   ultimately	   do	   more	   to	   push	   the	   same-­‐sex	   marriage	   debate	  forward	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Note	   the	   connection	  between	   these	  arguments	   and	   those	   I	  made	  earlier	   about	   agency.	   Here	   again,	   we	   see	   the	   same	   relationship	  between	   exit	   and	   voice,	   outsiders	   and	   insiders.	   It	   is	   precisely	   when	  states	   and	   localities	   are	   integrated	   into	   a	   national	   scheme—rather	  than	   standing	   separate	   and	   apart	   from	   it—that	   they	   have	   the	   power	  to	  set	  the	  agenda,	  to	  force	  a	  reluctant	  national	  elite	  to	  engage.	  Note	   also	   the	   connections	   here	   between	   agency	   and	   civil	  disobedience.	   Each	   forces	   the	  majority	   to	   act—either	   to	   overrule	   the	  outlier	   decision	   (agency)	   or	   to	   prosecute	   the	   dissenters	   (civil	  disobedience).	  Both	  thus,	  to	  borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  help	   “create	   .	   .	   .	   a	   crisis	   and	   establish	   such	   creative	   tension	   that	   a	  
	  	   84.	   Perry	  v.	  Brown,	  671	  F.3d	  1052	  (9th	  Cir),	  cert.	  granted	  sub	  nom.	  Hollingsworth	  v.	  Perry,	  133	  S.	  Ct.	  786	  (Dec.	  7,	  2012)	  (No.	  12-­‐144).	   In	   the	   interest	  of	   full	  disclosure,	   I	  should	  note	  that	   I	  supervise	  a	  program	  that	  has	  allowed	  Yale	  Law	  students	  to	  work	  on	  this	  case.	  	   85.	   Massachusetts	  v.	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  Health	  &	  Human	  Servs.,	  682	  F.3d	  1,	  5	  (1st	  Cir.	  2012).	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  community	   .	   .	   .	   is	   forced	   to	   confront	   the	   issue.”86	   Like	   Alexander	   M.	  Bickel’s	  account	  of	  civil	  disobedience,	  agency	   is	  “an	  exercise	  of	  power	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  Burke	  defined	  it”:	  an	  “attempt	  to	  coerce	  the	  legal	  order.”87	  Agency,	   in	   short,	  offers	  a	  key	  advantage	  precisely	  because	   it	  cedes	   to	   would-­‐be	   dissenters	   control	   over	   decisions	   without	   forcing	  them	  to	  exit.	  In	  contrast	  to	  exit	  and	  voice,	  it	  helps	  ensure	  that	  dialogue	  between	   the	   periphery	   and	   center—at	   the	   heart	   of	   both	   First	  Amendment	  and	  federalism	  theory—actually	  happens.	  If	  we	   are	   thinking	   about	   costs	   and	   benefits,	   of	   course,	   there	   are	  many	   instances	   when	   the	   polity	   might	   sensibly	   prefer	   not	   to	   have	   a	  decision	   forced	   upon	   it.	   Sometimes	   the	   issue	   has	   been	   settled,	   and	  properly	   so.	   We	   might	   well	   think	   in	   these	   situations	   that	   the	   only	  appropriate	   channels	   for	   dissent	   are	   voice	   and	   exit:	   speak	   up	   or	   get	  out.	  And	  a	  national	  government	  simply	  can’t	  function	  if	  it	  has	  to	  quash	  local	  rebellion	  whenever	  it	  makes	  a	  decision.	  Agency,	   though,	   also	   offers	   something	   that	   the	   polity	  might	   find	  useful	  when	  compared	  to	  voice	  and	  exit.	  The	  model	  presumes	  that	  the	  center	   can	   and	   should	   quash	   local	   rebellion	  when	   it	   sees	   fit.	   Exit—a	  conventional	   federalism	  model	  or	  a	  robust	  right	  to	  associate—shields	  policies	   that	   depart	   from	   a	   treasured	   national	   consensus.	   Agency,	   in	  contrast,	  makes	  space	  for	  the	  center	  to	  reverse	  the	  periphery	  when	  the	  latter	  pushes	   too	  hard.	  All	   the	  national	  majority	  needs	   to	  do	   is	   spend	  the	  political	  capital	  necessary	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  some	  situations,	  then,	  agency	  offers	  the	  polity	  a	  good	  deal	  more	  flexibility	   in	  dealing	  with	  would-­‐be	  dissenters	  than	  exit	  provides.	  Another	   feature	   that	   distinguishes	   agency	   from	   voice	   or	   exit	   is	  that	  it	  extends	  the	  time	  frame	  for	  dissent.88	  Those	  outside	  the	  national	  policymaking	  apparatus	  often	  have	  only	  a	  few	  realistic	  opportunities	  to	  influence	  a	  policy—for	  example,	   just	  before	  Congress	  passes	  a	   law	  or	  an	  agency	  issues	  a	  regulation.	  In	  these	  situations,	  the	  arguments	  aired	  by	   dissenters	   will	   often	   be	   cast	   in	   abstract	   terms,	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  pressure	  will	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  politicking	  that	  occurs	  ex	  ante,	  and	  the	  key	   players	   in	   the	   debate	   will	   be	   interest	   groups,	   lobbyists,	   and	  politicians.	  	  	   86.	   KING,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  291;	  see	  also	  RAWLS,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  366	  (“By	  engaging	  in	  civil	  disobedience	   a	   minority	   forces	   the	   majority	   to	   consider	   whether	   it	   wishes	   to	   have	   its	   actions	  construed	   in	   this	   way,	   or	   whether,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   common	   sense	   of	   justice,	   it	   wishes	   to	  acknowledge	  the	  legitimate	  claims	  of	  the	  minority.”).	  	   87.	   ALEXANDER	  M.	  BICKEL,	  THE	  MORALITY	  OF	  CONSENT	  99	  (1975).	  	   88.	   Bulman-­‐Pozen	  &	  Gerken,	  supra	  note	  38,	  at	  1292–93.	  
GERKEN IN PRINTER PROOF[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/13  4:34 PM 
2013]	   EXIT,	  VOICE,	  AND	  DISLOYALTY	   1383	  If	  would-­‐be	  dissenters	  enjoy	  opportunities	  to	  exercise	  agency,	  the	  ongoing	  conversation	  between	   the	  center	  and	   the	  periphery	  will	   look	  quite	  different,	   something	   that	   can	  be	   characterized	  as	   a	   feature	  or	   a	  bug.	  On	  the	  positive	  side,	  the	  debate	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  facts	  on	  the	  ground.	  Any	  debate	  that	  takes	  place	  ex	  post	  will,	  of	  course,	  offer	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  what	  a	  policy	  looks	  like	  in	  practice.	  And	  dissenters	  who	  serve	  as	  agents	  of	  the	  center	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  closer	  view	  of	  the	  facts	  on	   the	   ground	   and	   access	   to	   a	  wider	   range	   of	   facts.	   Giving	  would-­‐be	  dissenters	  two	  bites	  at	  the	  policymaking	  apple	  might	  lower	  the	  stakes	  of	   the	  debate,	  as	  dissenters	  will	  know	  that	   they	  will	  have	  a	  chance	   to	  soften	  the	  edges	  of	  a	  policy	  they	  oppose.	  The	  conversation	  between	  the	  center	  and	   the	  periphery	  won’t	  be	  a	  one-­‐off	  battle,	   but	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  iterative.	  Finally,	   ex	  post	  policymaking	  debates	  are	   likely	   to	   involve	  a	  different	  set	  of	  actors	  than	  ex	  ante	  ones.	  These	  debates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  include	  experts,	  or	  at	  least	  those	  with	  experience	  and	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  mission.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  costs	  to	  extending	  the	  time	  frame	  for	  debate.	  It	  allows	  dissenters	  to	  pursue	  a	  “death	  by	  a	  thousand	  cuts”	  strategy	  in	  challenging	   national	   policy.	   It	   gives	   them	   an	   opportunity	   to	   resist	   a	  policy	   sub	   rosa,	  without	   having	   to	  make	   their	   case	   on	   a	   public	   stage.	  Iterative	  processes	  aren’t	  always	  superior	  ones.	  Although	  we	  typically	  imagine	  an	   iterative	  process	   to	  be	  a	  dialogic	  one,	  an	   iterative	  process	  can	  also	  convert	  a	  one-­‐off	  battle	  into	  an	  ongoing	  war.	  And	  while	  these	  debates	  include	  a	  different	  set	  of	  decisionmakers,	  conversations	  within	  the	  informal,	  administrative	  realm	  may	  be	  less	  transparent—and	  thus	  less	  likely	  to	  include	  representatives	  of	  all	  stakeholding	  groups—than	  debates	  that	  take	  place	  during	  legislating	  or	  rulemaking.	  Dissent	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  interstices	  of	  federal	  policy	  will	  also	  look	  quite	  different	   from	  dissent	   that	   takes	   the	   form	  of	  voice.	  Agency	  cedes	  to	  dissenters	  genuine	  power—the	  power	  to	  make	  national	  policy	  rather	   than	   merely	   complain	   about	   it.	   But	   it	   also	   requires	   that	  dissenters	   pour	   their	   complaints	   into	   a	   fairly	   narrow	   policymaking	  space.	  Voice,	  in	  contrast,	  gives	  dissenters	  a	  chance	  to	  “get	  [their]	  genius	  expressed	  whole	  and	  entire.”89	  When	  they	  speak,	  they	  can	  offer	  a	  fully	  articulated	   argument	   in	   favor	   of	   their	   position.	  When	   they	   vote,	   they	  can	  express	  their	  disagreement	  across	  a	  far	  wider	  range	  of	  issues	  than	  they	  will	  encounter	  as	  agents	  within	  one	  policy	  domain	  or	  another.90	  	  	   89.	   VIRGINIA	  WOOLF,	  A	  ROOM	  OF	  ONE’S	  OWN	  75	  (reprt.	  1991)	  (1929).	  With	  apologies	  to	  Virginia	  Woolf.	  	   90.	   Thanks	  to	  Yair	  Listokin	  for	  pushing	  me	  on	  this	  point.	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B.	   Integration	  Think,	  for	  instance,	  about	  how	  “control	  without	  exit”	  fits	  with	  the	  extant	  work	  on	  dissent	  and	  the	  project	  of	  integration.	  This	  is	  a	  project	  I’ve	   taken	   up	   elsewhere,91	   so	   here	   I’ll	   offer	   just	   a	   thumbnail	   sketch.	  Many	   argue	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   First	   Amendment	   is	   to	   integrate	  political	   outliers	   into	   the	   polity.92	   But,	   interestingly	   enough,	   the	  strategies	  we	   have	   for	   doing	   so	   at	   least	   partially	   reify	   their	   status	   as	  minorities	  and	  outsiders.	  The	  rights	  afforded	  to	  dissenters	  push	  them	  outside	   of	   the	   project	   of	   governance.	   They	   can	   speak	   their	  mind,	   but	  only	  when	  they	  speak	  for	  themselves.	  They	  can	  speak	  truth	  to	  power,	  but	  not	  with	  it.	  Similarly,	   while	   federalism	   involves	   minorities	   in	   the	   project	   of	  governance,	   it	   does	   so	   only	   by	   allowing	   them	   to	  migrate	   to	   separate	  polities	   rather	   than	   to	   help	   govern	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   polity.	   When	  dissenters	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  project	  of	  governance	  inside	  the	  national	  system,	  they	  are	  condemned	  to	  the	  status	  of	  perpetual	  losers.	  It’s	   not	   hard	   to	   imagine	   that	   political	  minorities	  might	   value	   the	  chance	   to	   serve	   as	   policymaking	   insiders	   rather	   than	   autonomous	  outsiders.	   They	   might	   value	   the	   chance	   to	   stand	   in	   the	   shoes	   of	   the	  majority,	  to	  develop	  a	  different	  set	  of	  participatory	  skills,	  to	  enjoy	  the	  efficacy	   associated	   with	   agency.	   Agency,	   then,	   might	   exercise	   a	  centripetal	  force,	  pulling	  outliers	  into	  the	  national	  polity.	  Agency,	  of	  course,	   involves	  costs	  as	  well.	  Even	   if	  we	  discount	  the	  costs	  conventionally	  associated	  with	  bureaucratic	  dissensus,	  we	  might	  worry	  that	  agency	  can	  undermine	  the	  project	  of	  integration.	  While	  it’s	  all	   well	   and	   good	   to	   create	   opportunities	   for	   political	   minorities	   to	  enjoy	   decisionmaking	   control,	   agency	   carries	   with	   it	   the	   risk	   of	  reversal.	  And	   it	  might	  be	  quite	  debilitating	   for	  minorities	   to	   see	   their	  decisions	   subject	   to	   immediate	   reversal—all	   that	   work	   for	   nothing.	  Indeed,	   reversal	   might	   cause	   minorities	   to	   be	   less	   invested	   in	   the	  process	  going	  forward.	  Or	  it	  might	  not.	  Political	  setbacks	  can	  pull	  people	  still	  deeper	  into	  the	   process.	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	   the	   path	   the	   Christian	   Right	   took	  into	   politics.	   Early	   defeats	   galvanized	   more	   organizing.	   Decisions	   on	  abortion	   led	   to	   increasingly	   creative	   legislation	   and	   newly	   minted	  	  	   91.	   See	   generally,	   e.g.,	  CARTER,	   supra	   note	   73,	   at	   97–98;	   Gerken,	   supra	   note	   26;	  Heather	  K.	  Gerken,	  Second-­‐Order	  Diversity,	  118	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1099	  (2005).	  	   92.	   See,	  e.g.,	  SHIFFRIN,	  supra	  note	  64,	  at	  18;	  Thomas	  I.	  Emerson,	  Toward	  a	  General	  Theory	  of	  
the	  First	  Amendment,	  72	  YALE	  L.J.	  877,	  885	  (1963).	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  arguments	  designed	  to	  counter	  critics.	  Decisions	  on	  school	  prayer	   led	  members	  of	  the	  Christian	  Right	  to	  take	  over	  school	  boards.	  These	   interactions	   didn’t	   just	   pull	   political	   outliers	   into	   national	  politics;	   it	   caused	   them	   to	  moderate	   their	   arguments	   as	   they	   poured	  their	   views	   into	   a	   small	   policymaking	   space	   and	   carried	   on	   their	  continuing	   conversation	   with	   the	   center.	   Pro-­‐life	   arguments,	   for	  instance,	   now	   routinely	   include	   appeals	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   women.93	  Supporters	  of	  religion	  in	  schools	  have	  gone	  from	  teaching	  the	  Creation	  to	  teaching	  the	  controversy.	  	  
***	  
	  When	   one	   lays	   voice,	   exit,	   and	   agency	   side	   by	   side,	   it	   becomes	  clear	   that	   agency	   offers	   a	   competing	   and	   complementary	   channel	   for	  minority	   influence.	   Voice	   and	   exit	   have	   long	   been	   thought	   to	   play	  important	  roles	  in	  holding	  a	  fractious	  national	  polity	  together.	  Agency	  can	  play	  the	  same	  role	  because	  it	  offers	  minorities	  control	  without	  exit,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  majority	  paired	  with	  the	  status	  of	  the	  insider.	  CONCLUSION	  Let	  me	   conclude	   by	   returning	   to	   the	   puzzle	  with	  which	   I	   began.	  We	  are	  all	   aware	  of	   the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem.	  We	  are	  all	   aware	  of	  the	   power	   that	   agents	   wield	   in	   a	   highly	   decentralized,	   partially	  politicized	   system	   like	   our	   own.	   But	   these	   institutional	  arrangements—which	  will	  only	  become	  more	  important	  as	  local,	  state,	  and	   national	   regulatory	   structures	   become	   more	   integrated—have	  long	  been	  neglected	  by	   constitutional	   theorists.	   Constitutional	   theory	  has	  devoted	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  energy	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  a	  democracy	  owes	  its	  minorities.	  We	  have	  fully	  theorized	  accounts	  of	  voice	  and	  exit	  on	  both	  the	  structural	  and	  the	  rights	  side	  of	  the	  equation.	  But	  we	  have	  spent	   relatively	   little	   time	   on	   the	   possibility	   that	   minorities	   might	  make	   policy	   rather	   than	   complain	   about	   it,	   that	   they	   might	   wield	  power	   within	   the	   system	   rather	   than	   outside	   of	   it,	   that	   they	   might	  serve	  as	  connected	  critics	  rather	  than	  autonomous	  outsiders.	  We	  have	  missed	  the	  possibility	  that	  agency	  provides	  a	  third	  avenue	  of	  influence	  for	  minorities	  in	  a	  majoritarian	  system.	  
	  	   93.	   See	  Reva	  B.	  Siegel,	  The	  Right’s	  Reasons:	  Constitutional	  Conflict	  and	  the	  Spread	  of	  Woman-­‐
Protective	  Antiabortion	  Argument,	  57	  DUKE	  L.J.	  1641,	  1688	  (2008).	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  of	  this	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  agency	  is	  without	  cost.	  But	  neither	  is	  voice	  nor	  exit	  (that	   is	  one	  of	  Hirschman’s	  key	  points).	  The	  fact	   that	  federalism	   involves	   costs	   doesn’t	   prevent	   us	   from	   celebrating	   it.	   The	  same	   should	   hold	   true	   of	   uncooperative	   federalism.	   The	   fact	   that	  dissent	   involves	   costs	   doesn’t	   prevent	   us	   from	   revering	   it;	   the	   same	  should	   hold	   true	   of	   dissenting	   by	   deciding.	   Even	   if	   you	   think	   that	  agency	  is,	  on	  balance,	  harmful	  to	  our	  constitutional	  scheme,	  at	  the	  very	  least	   it’s	   useful	   to	   recognize	   its	   existence.	   What	   is	   useful	   about	  Hirschman’s	   framework	   is	   that	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   compare	   and	   contrast	  exit	   and	   voice,	   two	   competing	   and	   complementary	   channels	   of	  minority	   influence.	   Adding	   a	   third	   category	   to	   Hirschman’s	   typology	  can	  only	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  our	  democracy	  functions.	  	  
